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Abstract 
 
Decisions on the amount of cash have been playing an extremely important role in firm’s 
financial decisions. Several studies have emphasized the dramatic increase in cash holdings 
in the last few years. However, according to the literature (e.g. Bates et al, 2009), we 
document that the increase in the amount of cash was more pronounced for firms reporting 
negative cash flows. This project intends to understand which reason justifies firm’s decisions 
in terms of cash holdings, observing differences in behavior based on the information of the 
respective cash flow. We further test whether Hofstede’s cultural dimensions explain these 
variations in cash holdings. Moreover, we evaluate the impact exerted by financial constraints 
on negative cash flows firms in terms of cash. 
The sample consists of 335,355 company-year observations from 45 countries between 1992 
and 2016. We find evidence that support that loss firm’s cash decisions are linked to a 
heightened concern about cash flows. We also note that the increasing persistence of losses 
exacerbates the demand for cash. These results are consistent with our initial hypotheses. 
Based on the firms countries cultural characteristics we find that the main impact of 
individualism (negative), masculinity (positive), uncertainty avoidance (positive) and long-
term orientation (positive) is influenced with the magnitude of negative cash flows. Finally, 
we explore the importance of financial constraints on cash decisions. However, the influence 
of national culture variables is impacted by the magnitude of negative cash flows. These 
results are robust to alternative specifications, supporting that the precautionary motive is 
the main driver for the differences in cash holdings between loss and profit firms. 
Key-words: Cash holdings; Precautionary motive; Transaction motive; National culture; 
Financial constraints 
JEL-Codes: G3, G32, G39 
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Resumo 
 
As decisões relativas ao montante de caixa têm vindo a assumir um papel de extrema 
importância no seio das decisões empresariais de carácter financeiro. Diversos estudos 
documentam um aumento significativo dos montantes em caixa. No entanto, de acordo com 
a literatura (ex: Bates et al., 2009), documentamos que o aumento dos montantes de caixa é 
mais acentuado para empresas que reportam cash flows negativos. Este projeto pretende 
perceber qual o motivo que justifica as decisões das empresas em termos da definição dos 
montantes de caixa, percebendo as diferenças nos comportamentos tendo como base o sinal 
do respetivo cash flow. Adicionalmente, testamos o poder explicativo das variáveis culturais 
de Hofstede na explicação das variações registadas nos montantes de caixa. Também, 
avaliamos o impacto que as restrições financeiras exibem no caixa em empresas com cash 
flows negativos. 
A amostra é composta por 335,355 observações empresa-ano provenientes de 45 países 
compreendidos entre o ano de 1992 e 2016. De acordo com os resultados obtidos, 
encontramos evidências que comprovam que as decisões de caixa das empresas que reportam 
perdas estão vinculas a uma precaução adicional com os cash flows. Podemos mesmo 
verificar que o aumento da persistência das perdas exacerba a procura por cash. Estes 
resultados são consistentes com as nossas hipóteses iniciais. Obtivemos também resultados 
esclarecedores relativamente ao impacto da cultura nacional no montante de caixa. Não 
obstante, o impacto isolado das variáveis individualism (negativo), masculinity (positivo), 
uncertainty avoidance (positivo) e long-term orientation (positivo) é influenciado pela 
magnitude de cash flows negativos. Por fim, demonstramos a importância das restrições 
financeiras nas decisões de caixa. A magnitude das variáveis culturais sofre também o 
impacto derivado do sinal do cash flow. Estes resultados são, na sua maioria, robustos a 
especificações alternativas, provando que o motivo de precaução é o principal fator para as 
diferenças na relação dos montante  de caixa entre empresas com resultados positivos ou 
negativos. 
Palavras-Chave: Gestão Liquidez; Motivo Precaução; Motivo Transação; Cultura Nacional; 
Restrições Financeiras 
Classificação JEL: G3, G32, G39
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last two decades, several questions on the reasons for firms to hold cash have been 
extensively debated. Cash is an important component of firms’ balance sheet being the most 
liquid and one of the least profitable asset. Therefore, understanding the cash policy of a firm 
becomes a crucial issue that managers need to cover in order to improve its strategy of 
corporate financial management, which might affect the firm. The importance of cash is 
highlighted through the dramatic increase over the last years in corporate cash reserves. Bates 
et al. (2009) suggest that the average cash ratio, measured as the ratio of cash over assets, 
more than doubles from 10.5% in 1980 to 23.2% in 2006. Based on a sample of US firms, 
they find a significant yearly average increase of 0.46%, more pronounced for the subset of 
firms reporting negative operating cash flow. This becomes particularly important 
considering that firms with persistent operating losses behave differently from companies 
with positive cash flows in terms of corporate financial policy, including cash policy (Dennis 
and McKeon, 2017). Dennis and McKeon (2017) find that, between 1970 and 2015 in the 
US, average cash holdings increased 90% in firms with positive cash flows and 580% for 
companies with negative cash flows. 
The differences in cash policy decisions according to the sign of cash flow is also noted in 
our international sample. Between 1992 and 2016, we report that cash holdings of negative 
cash flow firm have increased roughly 39% against 30% for firms reporting positive cash 
flows. The motive that best explains this difference in corporate financial behavior remains 
not entirely known. Indeed, four primary motives for firms to hold cash are identified in the 
economic literature. The transaction motive predicts that firms should hold a level of cash 
that optimizes firm’s performance, avoiding the transaction costs associated with external 
markets or selling assets (Keynes, 1936). The precautionary motive defends that firms hold 
cash as a buffer, to prevent against adverse shocks or even to get benefits from good 
investment opportunities (Keynes, 1936). Under the agency motive, the existence of 
asymmetric information and conflicts of interest between managers and investors would 
affect the amount of cash that firms hold (Jensen, 1986). When these problems are 
exacerbated, firms will prefer internal cash financing rather than external financing (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984). The last is the tax motive, which states that firms would prefer to hold 
cash overseas to avoid tax payments associated with repatriating income (Foley et al., 2007).  
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This research first aims to understand which of these theories best describes the cash policy 
of negative operating cash flow firms, or if other explanations can be put forward to better 
understand their cash holding behavior. Although Dennis and McKeon (2017) have done 
something in line with what has been described, their empirical analyses focus only on US 
firms. However, as shown by several authors, as Jiang et al. (2016), the negative operational 
cash flows are not a particular phenomenon of US firms. Moreover, not only the magnitude 
of these negative operating cash flows has been increasing (Denis and McKeon, 2017), as 
well losses have become more persistent (Joos and  Plesko, 2004). 
This study also attempts to complement the current literature by including national culture 
as a determinant for negative cash flow firm’s cash policy decisions. The inclusion of national 
culture has been growing on important corporate financial decisions, such as Capital 
Structure (Chui et al., 2002), Dividend Payout Policy (Shao et al., 2010) and Cash Holdings 
(Chang and Noorbakhsh, 2009; Chen et al., 2015). Since cultural values influence managers, 
Chen et al. (2015) defend that cash holdings decisions cannot be effectively studied without 
considering national culture. Therefore, beyond the traditional firm-specific control 
variables, the country’s specific characteristics are also taken into account, in particular, its 
national culture. As a proxy for national culture, the Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) cultural 
dimensions is used, in particular, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and long-
term orientation. Besides the influence of these dimensions on the sample used by Chang 
and Noorbakhsh (2009) and Chen et al. (2015), the goal is to test the impact of these cultural 
variables on cash holdings policy. This allows understanding the role of losses in the 
interaction between cultural variables and cash holdings. 
Opposite to the vision of a perfect market environment advocated by Modigliani and Miller 
(1958), firms in a real-world need to hold cash in order to cover immediate expenses (e.g. 
expenses arising from their current activity or from investment projects), particularly those 
that face frictions when accessing external finance. Indeed, financial literature defines those 
firms as financially constrained. There are several measurements of financial constraints, such 
as the case of the methods used by Almeida et al. (2004), Whited and Wu (2006) and Kaplan 
and Zingales (1997). Since firms with negative net income are more prone to be financially 
constrained (Almeida et al., 2004), we argue that these firms respond with more cash to 
prevent from future cash flow shocks. This is in accordance with Han and Qiu (2007), which 
find that constrained firms increase their demand for cash in response to an increase in cash 
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flow volatility. In addition, we also test the impact of constraints on national culture traits 
for negative cash flow firms. 
Therefore, we extend the current literature by (i) studying the role of losses in cash holdings 
for several countries, allowing to make cross-country comparisons, as well the possibility of 
having a deeper knowledge of the reasons behind this cash policy behavior; (ii) include in the 
analysis the impact of the national culture, which controls for some constraints on 
conclusions due to differences between countries; (iii) analyze the cash policy behaviour of 
negative cash flow firms, according to their financial constraints. 
The methodology follows a double-clustered model based on panel data with the inclusion 
of both firm-specific control variables and natural culture dimensions. The research sample 
is comprised of 45 countries, from 1992 to 2016, resulting in 335,355 firm-year observations. 
Our findings suggest a strong effect of both precautionary and transaction motive on the 
cash ratio of negative cash flow firms. Nonetheless, the positive relation of masculinity and 
long-term orientation with cash holdings and the negative relation of individualism to the 
latter confirm the role of national culture in explaining the level of cash holdings. Indeed, we 
prove that the national culture influences the precautionary motive to firms hold cash. 
Meanwhile, we find that uncertainty avoidance is not significant in explaining the behavior 
of cash policy firms for our sample. In additional tests, we show evidence that constrained 
firms tend to adapt their cash holdings to changes in firm-risk. This segment of firms display 
an additional precaution in their cash policy due to their financial instability. 
The structure of this dissertation will proceed as follows. We start with the second chapter 
by presenting the existing literature regarding cash holdings, which presents the motives to 
hold cash, the main theories and the empirical literature associated. We proceed introducing 
the current literature on the relation of cash holdings to losses and to the national culture. In 
the third chapter, our hypothesis are scrutinized. Chapter four describe the variables used 
and the methodology. The chapter fifth presents the results and its interpretation in line with 
our hypothesis and current literature. Finally, chapter sixth provides the final remarks, 
limitations, and suggestions for future research. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
In this section, the main theories and findings on cash holdings are presented. It is divided 
in three different subsections each focusing on the main research theories about the subject. 
The first provides an overview of cash holdings, presenting the main motives and theories 
related to holding cash. This section end with the empirical evidence related with the main 
determinants of cash holdings. The second subsection presents some evidence regarding 
operating losses and the association with cash holdings. The last subsection defines national 
culture while displays the empirical evidence that connect the different dimensions to cash 
holdings. 
 
2.1. Cash Holdings 
 
Cash holdings can be defined as the portion of firms’ assets, which exhibit a high degree of 
liquidity. These are of crucial importance for the daily operation of every company, as 
provides the means to facilitating the payment of its obligations. 
One of the central issues of financial management is to ensure that the company has an 
adequate level of liquid assets, in order to invest in valuable projects and maintain its daily 
operations. However, the decision to hold cash carries both benefits and costs to firms and 
its shareholders. Ferreira and Vilela (2004) documented that cash holdings allow firms to 
undertake valuable projects regardless the unexpected financial constraints. In this case, the 
amount of cash is influenced by the degree of access that firms have to external capital 
markets.  Chen and Chuang (2009) show that cash may reduce transaction costs and can 
minimize the firm’s cash flow volatility. On the other hand, the decision to hold excessive 
amounts of cash carries costs (e.g. opportunity cost of holding cash) or may hide the loss of 
performance (Ferreira and Vilela 2004). 
 
2.2. Theoretical Motives for Holding Cash 
 
In a world of perfect capital markets, as assumed by Modigliani and Miller (1958), decisions 
regarding cash policy would be irrelevant. Firms facing a shortage of internal resources would 
simply access external markets, cut dividends or even sell their assets without affecting the 
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firm’s value (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Nevertheless, market imperfections do exist 
creating different motives for firms to hold cash, according to their needs. Keynes (1936) 
and Jensen (1986) clarify four possible motives for a firm to hold cash: (i) the transaction 
cost motive, (ii) the precautionary motive, (iii) the agency motive and (iv) the tax motive.  
The transaction cost motive documented by Keynes (1936) states that firms should have a 
certain level of cash to support its business operations, minimizing the costs of liquidating 
assets and the transactions costs associated with raising external finance. Opposite to what 
was presented by Modigliani and Miller (1958), the imperfections of the market can make it 
cheaper to hold cash rather than raise it on the market. Therefore, the transaction motive 
can be seen as a trade-off motive, since firms have a trade-off between minimizing the 
transaction costs of raising cash and minimizing the opportunity costs of holding cash (Kim 
et al., 1998).  
William Baumol (1952) developed a model that relate the demand of money with transaction 
costs, which is further explored by other researchers. Relying on the theoretical foundations 
of Baumol (1952), Opler et al. (1999) find that the optimal level of cash is given by the 
intersection of the marginal cost of having liquid assets and the marginal cost of being short 
on liquid assets. Several models examined some firm characteristics that were associated to 
the transaction motive to hold cash, as the firm size, cash flows, investment opportunities, 
dividends and leverage (Opler et al., 1999; Bates et al., 2009). Opler et al. (1999) find evidence 
that large firms will hold fewer levels of cash, as these firms have economies of scale 
associated with transaction costs. Kim et al. (1998) report that free cash flow is a determinant 
of cash holdings given that firms can use it as a substitute for cash. Regarding non-cash liquid 
assets, Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) find that it influences the level of cash because it can be a 
substitute for cash. 
Similar to the transaction motive, the precautionary motive is first introduced by Keynes 
(1936). Under this motive, cash is seen as a safety or self-insurance measure against times 
where external finance is costly or even unavailable (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Therefore, 
firms tend to accumulate cash to prevent cash shortages due to adverse business shocks or 
unanticipated future necessities. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) show that managers tend to hold 
cash in order to prevent losing valuable investment opportunities due to a cash shortage. 
This shortage of cash can also motivate the bankruptcy of the firm. Opler et al. (1999) show 
that cash holdings may reduce the expected costs related to financial distress.  
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Through a theoretical model, Miller and Orr (1966), find that the demand for cash increase 
along with the increase in cash flow volatility. Bates et al. (2009) add that not only firms with 
riskier cash flows but also firms with poor access to external capital tend to hold more cash. 
Almeida et al. (2004) further examine the relation between the accumulation of cash and the 
presence of financial constraints. Their results suggest a positive cash-cash flow sensitivity, 
which means that constrained firms tend to increase their liquid assets.  Opler et al. (1999) 
and Ferreira and Vilela (2004) find that the level of capital markets development is negatively 
related with cash holdings, which is supportive of the precautionary motive to hold cash.  
Additionally, a negative relation between capital expenditures and cash holdings has been 
reported (Stulz, 2007; Bates et al. 2009). This happens because capital expenditures can create 
assets that could act as a collateral, therefore increasing the debt capacity (Stulz, 2007). Firms 
with more debt capacity tend to hold less cash (Bates et al., 2009). The precautionary motive 
also predicts that dividend paying firms are less risky and therefore have lower levels of cash. 
(Opler et al., 1999 and Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). 
The agency theory, documented by Jensen (1986), is also seen as a motive that explains the 
level of firm’s cash holdings. The agency motive refers to the influence exerted on cash 
holdings by the conflict between managers and the principal (shareholders and debtholders). 
Jensen (1986) refers that firm managers have an incentive to stockpile cash, rather than 
increase the payout to shareholders. Furthermore, self-interested managers have a preference 
to increase their utility at expense of shareholders (Jensen, 1986). In this case, the manager 
would overinvest in order to increase the firm size or have a greater discretionary power 
within the firm. The agency problem is more pronounce for firms with large free cash flows 
and limited investment opportunities (Jensen, 1986; Dittmar et al., 2003). Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith (2007) reported that when agency problems are more severe, the value assigned to an 
additional dollar of cash is lower. 
The notion of cash being wastefully spent by managers is widely explored in the literature, 
however relating it to agency problems is not easy. The solution in most studies is to rely on 
proxies, mainly the level of shareholder protection and measures of corporate governance. 
Regarding shareholder protection, Dittmar et al. (2003) and Guney et al. (2007) find that this 
variable has a negative relation with cash holdings, considering that firms in countries with 
poor shareholder protection tend to hold the double of cash than firms in countries with 
good shareholder protection. Harford et al. (2008) found a relation between corporate 
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governance and cash holdings. Firms with scarce corporate governance hold more cash and 
these firms tend to spend their cash quickly. Harris and Raviv (2008) show that a larger board 
provide optimal monitoring when managers' opportunities to consume perquisites are high.  
The last motive that can justify the level of cash holdings by firms is the tax motive. This 
concerns to the repatriation of income of foreign subsidiaries to the home country of 
multinational firms. Foley et al. (2007) find strong evidence in the US consistent with taxes 
on foreign earnings affecting cash balances. This evidence is stronger for firms that neither 
have attractive investment opportunities nor are financially constrained in their home 
country. Therefore, US firms with higher repatriation tax costs have larger cash holdings. 
Faulkender et al. (2017) defend that some firm characteristics presented in the study of Bates 
et al. (2009) only explain corporate cash associated with precautionary motives in the 
variation of domestic cash. Denis and Mckeon (2017) suggest that the tax motive does not 
influence the increase in cash holdings for companies with negative cash flows. Only 8.5% 
of their sample of firms reporting negative operating results also report foreign income. 
The motives above represents the basis for the three theories in the field of corporate 
finance, which explain the firms’ characteristics that have an influence on cash holdings. The 
first two motives are the most mentioned in the financial literature. 
 
2.3. Cash Holdings Theory 
 
Corporate cash holdings are affected by different firm-specific characteristics depending on 
three advanced theories: the Trade-Off theory, Pecking Order theory and Free Cash Flow 
theory. Therefore, the rationality behind each of the theories is explored in the next sections. 
 
2.3.1. Trade-Off Theory 
 
The trade-off model is based on the assumption that firm’s management is always concerned 
with the maximization of the shareholder value. Therefore, they will pursue an optimal level 
of cash by weighting the trade-off between the marginal benefits and marginal costs of having 
cash (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). 
According to Opler et al. (1999), cash holdings can efficiently reduce the likelihood of 
financial distress, since in the case of unexpected decrease in firm’s cash flow or even some 
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capital market constraints, cash would act as a reserve. Having cash allows companies to save 
on transactions costs on the access of capital markets and avoid the liquidation of assets to 
meet obligations. Moreover, sufficient cash holdings benefit firms that are financially 
constrained ensuring the achievement of an optimal investment policy, by reducing the 
external dependence. (Kim et al., 1998; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004).  
Nevertheless, holding cash has associated a number of costs. First, there is an opportunity 
cost associated with cash; given it has a lower return when compared to other investments 
(Dittmar et al., 2003). Second, Dittmar et al. (2003) also highlight the issue of fees paid to 
access external financing, namely the transaction costs. Third, Opler et al. (1999) defend that 
agency problems can arise when cash levels are high. Therefore, according to the Trade-Off 
theory each firm reach their optimal level of cash by the intersection between the marginal 
curve cost of holding liquid assets and the marginal curve cost of being short on liquid assets. 
 
2.3.2. Pecking-Order Theory 
 
The pecking order theory assumed that firms prefer one type of financing above others when 
financing investments (Myers, 1984). The key aspect in this theory is the argument that 
managers (insiders) own more information and knowledge about the firm value than 
potential investors (outsiders) do. This information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders increase the costs of access external markets (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Therefore, in the presence of asymmetric information the firm follow a so-called hierarchy 
of financing policies. Internal funds assumes the first option to finance investments 
opportunities, followed by debt and equity issuance (Myers, 1984). If internally generated 
funds (operating cash flows) are sufficient to fund new valuable investment projects, the 
company might choose to either lower its debt or accumulate cash. Otherwise, firms should 
use accumulated cash holdings to finance new projects and, if need, they can issue debt. This 
preference order arises as method to reduce asymmetric information costs. 
 
2.3.3. Free Cash Flow Theory 
 
The free cash flow theory (Jensen, 1986) is based on the notion that managers have incentives 
to hold larger amounts of cash, thus challenging the assumption about an optimal level of 
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cash holdings. The decision of firms may diverge from the amount of cash that maximize 
shareholders' value since managers could use cash for other purposes (Jensen, 1986). 
According to the model, cash holdings can be used to increase managers' benefits. This 
occurs because it increase manager’s discretionary power to finance new investments that 
would not have been approved by the capital market. In addition, excess cash increases 
managers' financial flexibility and reduces the pressure to improve their performance 
(Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Ultimately, if shareholders believe that managers are hoarding 
cash for non-identifiable reasons they would downgrade the stock, undercutting the firm 
value. 
 
2.4. Empirical Evidence 
 
Since cash holding became an active topic in liquidity research, numerous studies have 
focused on assessing the motives and determinants of cash holdings across different 
countries and industries. Bellow, we present the most important empirical studies in this 
field. 
Lamont (1997) confirms that cash matters in order to take advantage of investment 
opportunities. The author found that when oil sector firms are exposed to business shocks, 
they tend to reduce investment as the cash holdings decrease. 
Kim et al. (1998) in an empirical study based on the trade-off model analyzes the benefits 
and costs of holding cash, based on a sample of 915 US industrial firms. The authors find 
that the amount of cash is an increasing function of the cost of external finance, volatility of 
future cash flows and the profitability of future investment opportunities. Thus, growth 
opportunities, cash flow volatility and lower profitability have a positive relation to cash 
holdings. Although this is not always significant, firm size seems to have a negative 
relationship with cash holdings. If it is considered the positive relation between firm size and 
the access to capital markets these findings are consistent with the transaction cost model 
(Kim et al., 1998).  
Opler et al. (1999) were the first to study the determinants and implications of cash holdings 
among a sample of publicly traded U.S. firms from 1971 to 1994. They systematically find 
that smaller firms, firms with significant growth opportunities and firms with more volatility 
on cash flows tend to hold more cash. On the contrary, firms with higher credit quality tend 
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to hold fewer amounts of cash. Their findings are in accordance with the precautionary 
motive to hold cash. Moreover, Opler et al. (1999) do not find a significant relation to other 
well-known motive, the agency costs motive. 
At an international level, Dittmar et al. (2003) developed a study with respect to international 
corporate governance and corporate cash holdings. For a single-year sample of 45 countries 
with more than 11,000 firms, the authors find a negative and strong association between 
shareholder rights and cash holdings. Indeed, firms in countries with the lower protection of 
shareholder rights tend to hoard twice as much cash than firms in countries with good 
protection of shareholder rights (Dittmar et al., 2003). Therefore, they conclude that agency 
cost is an important determinant of corporate cash holdings. Chang and Noorbakhsh (2006) 
found similar results for a sample of 48 countries, i.e. a negative association between 
shareholder rights protection and cash levels. 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) studied the determinants of cash holdings, in particular the role of 
ownership and control structure as determinants for cash holdings. Based on a sample of 
UK firms for the period of 1984 to 1999, Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) conclude that there is a 
significant non-monotonic relationship between managerial ownership and cash levels. 
Fundamentally, as the managerial ownership increases until 24% the level of cash holdings 
decrease. Cash level start to increase when the managerial ownership increases up to 64%, 
falling at higher levels. In addition, they found that cash flow and growth opportunities have 
a positive association with cash, while leverage and bank debt have a negative association. 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) developed a study of the cash holdings’ determinants for 12 
Economic and Monetary Union countries, from 1987 until 2000. They conclude that cash 
holdings are negatively associated to leverage, size and the amount of liquid assets substitutes 
while having a positive association with the investment opportunity set and cash flows. Using 
as a proxy for investor protection both the quality of law enforcement and the character of 
legal rules, they also suggest that firms with superior investment protection hold more cash. 
Using a sample of US manufacturing firms between 1971 and 2000, Almeida et al. (2004) 
introduced financial constraints in the model of corporate demand for liquidity. Accordingly, 
they found that firms facing financial constraints have a greater propensity to accumulate 
cash out of their cash flows. In contrast, unconstrained firms do not display any systematic 
pattern. 
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Guney et al. (2007) examined the cash holding behaviour of firms from France, Germany, 
Japan, UK and US, particularly the relation between cash holdings and leverage. Their sample 
includes 4069 firms between 1996 and 2000. They argue that leverage have a non-monotonic 
relation to cash. Hence, leverage has a negative association to cash holdings to the extent 
that leverage is connected to the ability of a firm to issue debt. However, since an increase 
in leverage represents a greater risk of financial distress, the relation becomes positive at high 
levels of leverage, which is supportive of the precautionary motive. They expand their study 
to the influence of country-specific characteristics, as the degree of shareholder protection, 
ownership concentration and creditor protection and find that strong investor protection 
and high ownership concentration leads firms to hold fewer amounts of cash. 
Bates et al. (2009) investigated the evolution of cash holdings in the US from 1980 to 2006. 
They find that the increase in cash holdings in the last years is attributable to the 
precautionary motive rather than agency explanations. They state that the increase in the 
level of cash over the period is mostly explained by changes in firm characteristics, such as 
the decrease in non-cash working capital, the decrease in Capital Expenditures and the 
increase both in cash flow volatility and in R&D. 
Al-Najjar and Yacine Belghitar (2011), based on a large sample of 400 UK non-financial 
firms from 1991 to 2008, explored the link between corporate cash holdings and dividend 
policy.  Their empirical analysis reflects that cash holdings are affected by size, growth, 
leverage, working capital ratio, profitability, risk and dividends. However, when controlled 
for endogeneity the dividend policy does not affect cash holdings. 
Later, Al Najjar (2013) decided to explore corporate cash holding on a group of emerging 
markets1, in terms of the impact of firm characteristics and corporate governance issues. The 
author find that emerging markets share similar patterns to developed markets in terms of 
cash holdings determinants. Lastly, they find that and dividend payout and leverage are 
negatively related to cash balances while size is positively related. 
Dennis and Mckeon (2017) tried to understand the reason behind the dramatic increase in 
cash holdings from a different perspective, the perspective of firms reporting losses. With a 
sample of US firms between 1970 and 2016, they document that the increase in cash holdings 
is not due to an increase in agency problems, tax motives or cash flow volatility but rather 
                                                 
1 The group of countries are Brazil, Russia, India, and China. 
12 
on an additional precautionary demand. Cash holdings are negatively associated with 
leverage, capital expenditures, size and dividends, while is positively associated with cash 
flow volatility and growth opportunities. 
In table 1 we report the summary of empirical findings on the relation between cash holdings 
and financial determinants: 
 
 vi 
 
 
Table 1: Summary of findings on cash holdings 
Authors Firm Size Cash Flow 
Investment 
Opportunities 
Dividend payment Leverage 
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
Capital 
Expenditures 
Kim et al. (1998) n.s. - + n.a. - + n.a. 
Opler et al. (1999) - + + - - + + 
Dittmar et al. (2003) - + + n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) n.s. + + n.s. - n.s. n.a. 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) - + + n.s. - - n.a. 
Guney et al. (2007) n.s. - + n.s. +/- n.s. + 
Bates et al. (2009) +/- +/- + +/- - + +/- 
Al-Najjar and Belghitar (2011) - n.s. + - - n.a. n.a. 
Al Najjar (2013) + n.a. n.a. - - n.a. n.a. 
Dennis and McKeon (2017) - +/- + - - + - 
 
Table 1 shows the relationships between cash holdings and the transaction and precautionary motive determinants. The signal "+" indicates that the explanatory variable is significantly 
positively related with the dependent variable, while a "-" indicates a negative relationship. The "n.s." indicates that the authors do not find a significant relationship between the 
respective variables and the dependent variable. Situation when the authors did not test the variables are denoted with “n.a.”.
 vi 
 
2.5. Losses and Cash Holdings 
 
Over the last years, several studies have identified an increase in firms reporting losses. The 
relation between this trend and several financial decisions represents an important challenge 
and has been topic of study by several authors. Joos and Plesko (2004) show that the 
percentage of firms reporting losses in S&P Compustat increase from 15% in the 1970’s to 
roughly 35% in the 1990’s. Denis and McKeon (2017) in their study also found a decreasing 
trend in the evolution of the profitability among US firm. In 1950, about 2% of public firms 
listed in Compustat reported operating losses2 and the percentage registered a huge increase 
to over 30% in more recent years. The operating losses have not only become more 
persistent over time, as documented by Joos and Plesko (2004), but also the magnitude of 
these losses has grown considerably (Denis and McKeon, 2017). However, listed firms 
reporting losses is not a particular event among US firms. Jiang et al. (2016) documented an 
equal tendency also occurring in UK firms.  
This increase frequency of firms reporting losses is not just a consequence of a rising in R&D 
expenditures since similar patterns occur even when measuring operating cash flows without 
considering R&D (Denis and McKeon, 2017). Moreover, Denis and McKeon (2017) 
evidence an increase in the volatility of cash flows, which Bates et al. (2009) connect to the 
constant increase in average corporate cash holdings.  
Consistent with Fama and French (2004)3, Klein and Marquardt (2006) found that smaller 
firms generally are the ones who report lower earnings and are more likely to report losses. 
This is due to economic factors intrinsic to this segment of firms: they are less diversified, 
have more idiosyncratic risk and undertake riskier projects (Klein and Marquardt, 2006). 
Denis and McKeon (2017) show that firms reporting negative operating cash flows behave 
differently in several dimensions of corporate financial decisions, including the cash policy. 
During the 45 years under analysis, firms with positive operating cash flows increased only 
90% their average cash holdings in opposition to an increase of 580% of negative operating 
cash flow firms (Denis and McKeon, 2017).  Bates et al. (2009) also report that negative cash 
flow firms represent more than half of the increase in average cash holdings of US firms. 
                                                 
2 Operating losses are define as negative cash flow from operations. 
3 Fama and French (2004) documented that the profitability and growth of listed firms after 1979 are due to 
small firms. 
15 
2.6. National Culture 
 
A growing body of recent literature has been suggesting that there is a particular country-
specific factor that should be consider when one study the economic phenomena, which is 
the effect of the cultural environment. Li et al. (2013) documented that the national cultural 
affects managers’ views and preferences, even in a highly globalized world with sophisticated 
managers. Therefore, national culture matters in corporate decisions. The impact of national 
cultural on cash holdings was first study by Chang and Noorbakhsh (2009) and then by Chen 
et al. (2015). Both authors based their study on the assumption that, despite the various forms 
of governance structures and different stages of financial developments, cash holdings 
cannot be effectively studied without considering the diverse cultural inheritances. 
Conducting a study for firms in more than 40 different countries, they apply the framework 
by Hofstede4 (1980, 2001). Six dimensions compose the framework, where each one captures 
a cultural characteristic. The dimensions are: Individualism, Power Distance, Uncertainty-
Avoidance, Masculinity and Long-Term Orientation and Indulgence. 
In countries characterized by high levels of masculinity, managers tend to pursue their 
personal success, which involves taking risks and usually valueless investment opportunities. 
Thus, they accumulate large amounts of cash so they do not have to submit themselves to 
an outside scrutiny that they would need to have access to external funds (Chang and 
Noorbakhsh, 2009). Chang and Noorbakhsh (2009) found that the cultural dimension long-
term orientation also influences the level of cash holdings. Long-Term oriented countries 
put emphasis on savings and tend to be conservative, while short-term oriented countries 
tend to be more aggressive in terms of spending. Therefore, Chang and Noorbakhsh (2009) 
show evidence that countries with long-term orientation tend to hold excessive cash 
balances. The last dimension of the study of Chang and Noorbakhsh (2009) was uncertainty-
avoidance. Managers in uncertainty avoidance cultures tend to avoid uncertainty, mainly 
related to future cash flows. On the other hand, in low uncertainty avoidance cultures 
managers easily accept changes and are more will to take risks5. Their findings, later 
reinforced by Chen et al. (2015), was that firms in countries that do not tolerate uncertainty 
                                                 
4 Hofstede’s defined culture as “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes members of one 
human group from another”. 
5 Although uncertainty avoidance is not the same as risk aversion (Hofstede, 1980), Li et al. (2013) evidence a 
negative association between uncertainty avoidance and corporate risk taking. 
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are more likely to have larger cash reserves. In addition, Chen et al. (2015) find a relevant 
negative association between individualism and cash holdings6. Managers in individualistic 
cultures tend to be overly confidence and often displaying the self-attribution bias7. Hence, 
these managers usually underestimate the need for cash (Chen et al. 2015). These authors 
also find that individualism and uncertainty avoidance influence the precautionary motive 
for holding cash. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Consistent with Li et al. (2013), who found a positive association between individualism and corporate risk 
taking. 
7 People’s tendency to ascribe any personal success to their own talent, while blaming failure in bad luck 
(Hastorf, Scheneider and Polefka, 1970). 
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3. Hypothesis Development 
 
Based on the motives and empirical evidence of the previous studies, this section introduces 
the research hypotheses. These hypotheses are a result of two research questions, based on 
the findings of Dennis and McKeon (2017), stating that firms’ cash policy varies according 
to their cash flows. Thus, negative operating firms tend to hold more cash than firms 
reporting operating profits (Dennis and McKeon, 2017). To our knowledge, this is the only 
study that analyzes the relation between negative cash flows and cash holdings, although it 
only includes US firms in the sample. Therefore, the first part attempt to test whether this is 
a particular phenomenon for US firms and study which motive can be linked to the cash 
policy behavior of firms reporting losses. However, only two main motives are considered 
for firms to hoard cash: the precautionary and the transaction motive. The other two 
documented motives are not considered in this model. The second part includes the study 
of the interaction between national culture and cash holdings of firms reporting losses, 
attempting to test the impact in firms reporting losses. 
i) Precautionary Motive 
The precautionary motive predicts that firms hold more cash to prevent from future cash 
flow shocks. In this regard, when firms are currently facing operating losses they increase the 
probability of financial distress due to the incapacity to solve financial obligations or the 
incapacity to engage in value investment projects (Guney et al., 2007). Therefore, the demand 
for cash can increase due to the documented increase in firms reporting losses or due to the 
increase in the persistence of these losses (Dennis and McKeon, 2017). This means that the 
level of cash can increase due the expected level of future cash flows rather than the volatility 
of them. Therefore, we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Consistent with the precautionary motive, we expect a negative 
relation between operating cash flows and the level of cash. 
ii) Transaction Motive 
The transaction motive assumes that firms should have cash to support its operations, 
avoiding the costs of accessing the external markets (Keynes, 1936). Kim et al. (1998) state 
that cash flows are a substitute for cash, exhibiting a negative relation. Essentially, we expect 
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firms to hold more cash when the financial variable cash flow is negative. Indeed, firms can 
become financially constrained8 if operational losses become persistent. The hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Consistent with the transaction motive, we expect a negative relation 
between operating cash flows and the level of cash. 
The second research question aims to understand the influence of the national culture in the 
level of cash hoard by firms. As stated in the literature there are four dimensions already 
studied that impact on the cash level: Uncertainty-Avoidance, Individualism, Masculinity and 
Long-Term Orientation. Although Chen et al. (2015) show that only uncertainty-avoidance 
and individualism influences the precautionary motive to hold cash, this study will include 
the four dimensions. In addition, this study will also analyze the interaction effects between 
these cultural dimensions and firm risk characteristics. 
iii) Individualism vs. Collectivism 
According to Hofstede (1980, 2001), individualist countries put emphasis on themselves and 
their immediate families, searching their personal achievements. In opposite, in collectivist 
societies people see themselves and others as a part of a group. In this line, Chui and Kwok 
(2008) find an interesting relation between this cultural dimension and life insurance 
consumption. People in individualist countries rely on market-based life insurances, instead 
relying on others. Indeed, according to Chui and Kwok (2008), in individualist cultures, 
people see the dependence as a weakness. Unlike this, in collectivist societies people have 
the dependence on other, expecting their support if a person dies early. 
Moreover, the dimension individualism is strictly connected to overconfidence (Chen et al., 
2015) and to corporate risk-taking (Li et al., 2013). Shao et al. (2010) support this view, 
showing that in individualist countries firms tend to invest more in long term risky-assets, 
invest more in R&D and prefer to use excess cash to increase R&D rather than to pay 
dividends. Current literature shows that countries displaying greater levels of individualism 
tend to take more risks. In addition, Chen et al. (2015) find that firms in countries with low 
individualism are likely to hold more precautionary cash. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
 
                                                 
8 The need to sell assets to face persistent losses can decrease the firm size. According to the transaction motive, 
Opler et al.(1999) evidence a negative relation between size and cash holdings. 
 
19 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): There is a negative association between individualism and cash 
holdings. 
Hypothesis 3.1 (H3.1): Firms reporting losses in individualistic countries hold less cash. 
iv) Masculinity vs Feminity 
Hofstede (1980, 2001) defines the masculinity dimension, in a business context, as the score 
which measures the degree of cultural toughness versus tenderness. Managers in masculine 
societies are performance driven individuals given that organizations are more focused on 
results. These societies tend to reward individuals based on their performance rather than on 
equality (Chang and Noorbakhsh, 2009). When faced with investment opportunities, they 
tend to examine the facts individually and to base their decision on their personal judgment, 
having an "aggressive" attitude. They are willing to make risky decisions if they have a reward 
for a share of the decisions success. Therefore, to avoid being subject of an external 
evaluation, they tend to hold more cash to have freedom in their decisions. However, given 
their aggressive behavior9 in the investment decision, they usually spend cash on risky and 
less valuable projects (Chang and Noorbakhsh, 2009). Cash holdings decisions in highly 
masculinity societies might be related to the agency costs theory (Chang and Noorbakhsh, 
2009). Following the empirical literature, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): There is a positive association between masculinity and cash holdings. 
Hypothesis 4.1 (H4.1): Firms reporting losses in masculinity countries hold more cash. 
v) Uncertainty Avoidance  
Uncertainty Avoidance is one dimension of national culture (Hofstede 1980, 2001) that 
expresses the degree to which people feel comfortable to deal with uncertainty and 
ambiguity. In high uncertainty countries, people dislike the uncertainty and try to avoid 
changes, while low uncertainty societies easily accept changes and risk10. This cultural 
dimension was found as influencing the level of cash holdings (Chang and Noorbakshsh, 
2009; Chen et al., 2015). In finance, the dimension reflects the tendency of managers to avoid 
the uncertainty and is negatively associated with corporate risk-taking (Li et al., 2013). In 
                                                 
9 This aggressive behaviour comes from the persistent pursuit of competitive advantages and abnormal rates 
of return. 
10 Rieger et al. (2014) argues that “equalizing uncertainty avoidance with risk aversion is an oversimplification”, 
since they find a relation between higher Uncertainty Avoidance and more risk seeking in losses. 
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addition, it impacts the precautionary motive to hold cash, as high uncertainty avoidance 
cultures tend to hold more precautionary cash (Chen et al.,2015). Under the precautionary 
motive, it is expected that in more uncertainty avoidance countries firms tend to have higher 
levels of cash, to prevent unexpected situations. Based on this evidence, the fourth 
hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): There is a positive association between uncertainty avoidance and cash 
holdings. 
Hypothesis 5.1 (H5.1): Firms reporting losses in uncertainty avoidance countries hold more 
cash. 
vi) Long Term Orientation vs Short Term Normative Orientation 
In long-term oriented societies managers highlight patience, persistence, perseverance and 
savings. These societies prefer to maintain honored traditions and norms (Hofstede, 1980, 
2001). Indeed, the humiliation in cases of failure (e.g. bankruptcy) force managers to avoid 
risky opportunities with short-term perspectives that might not be successful in the long-
run. Ferris et al.(2013)11 document that CEOs exhibit overconfidence in countries with a 
short-term orientation, as well in more individualistic countries. Chang and Noorbakhsh 
(2009) found that this cultural dimension presented by Hofstede (1980, 2001) has an impact 
on cash holdings. Investment opportunities in countries that are more long-term oriented 
are evaluated based on their capacity to generate future sustainable value on the long-term 
rather than in the short-term. Therefore, long-term orientation societies prefer safer 
investments, while short-term oriented cultures are more aggressive and encourage spending 
(Chang and Noorbakhsh, 2009). According to these findings the hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): There is a positive association between long-term orientation and cash 
holdings. 
Hypothesis 6.1 (H6.1): Firms reporting losses in long-term oriented countries hold more 
cash. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Ferris et al. (2013) studied the role of CEO overconfidence in M&A activity. 
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vii) Financial Constraints 
The essence of financial constraints is the firm’s ability to access external funding. Usually, 
constrained are defined as younger, smaller and firms that faces higher resistance when 
accessing external funds (Almeida et al., 2004). The propensity that constrained firms have 
to invest depend more in the available cash funds rather than in the existence of positive net 
present value projects (Hubbard and Petersen, 1988). In this regard, Almeida et al. (2004) 
report that constrained firms have a positive cash flow sensitivity of cash, while 
unconstrained firms should not display a propensity to save cash out of cash inflows.  In 
addition, Almeida et al. (2004) report that firms with negative net income are more likely to 
be financially constrained. Han and Qiu (2007) demonstrate that the impact of cash flow 
volatility on firms’ cash holdings is dependent on its financial constraints. Indeed, these 
authors found that in response to an increase in the cash flow volatility, firms tend to increase 
their cash holdings.  Therefore, in this study we explore if the link between financial 
constraints, cash flow volatility and the demand for liquidity is reinforced as an important 
determinant of cash policy of a firm reporting negative losses. Therefore, our hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 7 (H7): There is a positive association between cash flow volatility of financial 
constraints measures and cash holdings. 
Hypothesis 7.1 (H7.1): Constrained firms with negative cash flows in individualistic 
countries hold more cash than unconstrained firms. 
Hypothesis 7.2  (H7.2): The relation with cash of constrained firms with negative cash 
flows in masculinity countries comparing with unconstrained firms is ambiguous. 
Hypothesis 7.3 (H7.3): Constrained firms with negative cash flows in uncertainty 
avoidance countries hold more cash than unconstrained firms. 
Hypothesis 7.4  (H7.4): The relation with cash of constrained firms with negative cash 
flows in long-term oriented countries comparing with unconstrained firms is ambiguous. 
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4. Data and Methodology 
 
In this study, we use as sample a panel data of firms collected from Thomson Worldscope 
database for 46 countries. The sample, over the period 1992-2016, includes survivor and 
non-survivor firms. Following standard practice, we exclude financial firms because these 
firms must meet statutory capital requirements and their business involves inventories of 
marketable securities that are included in cash. Utility firms were also excluded because in 
many countries their cash holdings are subject to regulatory supervision. Regarding the 
national culture factors, the dimensions were gathered through a database provided by 
Hofstede12. Observations from countries for which Hofstede’s cultural dimensions were not 
available were removed. All the main variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
4.1. Dependent Variable 
 
This research intends to study cash holdings, thus we use cash ratio as a way to measure it. 
The literature presents several ways to measure the cash ratio, such as cash and cash 
equivalents deflated by total assets (Kim et al., 1998; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Bates et al., 
2009; Dudley and Zhang, 2016; Dennis and McKeon, 2017). Opler et al. (1999) and Ferreira 
and Vilela (2004) use another approach, which is to consider the cash ratio as the ratio of 
cash divided to net assets. Foley et al. (2007), Bates et al. (2009) and Dudley and Zhang 
(2016) provide more ways to measure the cash ratio, as the logarithm of cash to net assets, 
the logarithm of cash to total assets and cash divided by sales. In this research, we follow the 
authors that measure the dependent variable as the cash and cash equivalents divided by total 
assets. 
 
4.2. Independent Variables 
 
Consistent with the existing literature, several variables describing the two motives 
(precautionary and transaction) to hold cash are used in our research. In addition, variables 
related to Hofstede’s cultural dimensions for the period are included. One problem that 
usually is highlighted to these dimensions is related to the time lapse of the study.  
                                                 
12 The data for Hofstede’s dimensions for each country was taken from http://geerthofstede.com/research-
and-vsm/dimension-data-matrix/ 
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Considering that the Hofstede’s study was conducted in the 1980s, authors often argue that 
the dimensions have changed over the years, weakening the link with corporate cash 
holdings. However, in his book Culture’s Consequences (2001) Hofstede shows that more 
than 200 external comparative studies have supported the original findings. To confirm the 
robustness of the results, one alternative measure for cultural dimensions will be applied, the 
Tang and Koveos’ cultural indices13 (2008). 
Regarding variables that affect the precautionary and the transaction motive, we use the 
following: 
i) Cash Flow (CFLOW) 
Kim et al. (1998) defend that cash flow provides an internal source of liquidity to meet 
operating expenditures and liabilities. The literature is ambiguous regarding this variable. 
On the one hand some researchers (e.g. Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004) 
suggest a positive relation, as firms with higher cash flows stockpile more cash. Opposite 
to this, the literature present evidence of a negative relationship between cash flow and 
cash holdings (Kim et al., 1998). According to the precautionary motive to hold cash, as 
cash flow can be seen as a substitute for cash, a negative relation is expected. In 
accordance with several authors, this variable is measured as the earnings after taxes plus 
depreciation divided by total assets (e.g. Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Ozkan and Ozkan, 
2004; Bates et al., 2009). 
 
ii) Industry Cash Flow Volatility (ICFVOL) 
Bates et al. (2009) identify the increase in cash flow volatility as one of the main 
determinants of the historical increase in cash holdings. Firms facing higher levels of 
volatility on cash flows have difficulties to make an accurate prediction of the future cash 
flows. This increase in the uncertainty induces the possibility of a shortage of cash and 
increases the probability of financial distress. According to the precautionary motive in 
order to prevent this, firms should hold more cash. However, the literature also shows a 
negative relation as reported by Ferreira and Vilela (2004).  Nonetheless, this means that 
the sign of this variable is ambiguous. In order to measure cash flow volatility, we use 
the standard deviation of industry cash flow computed based on the method of Opler et 
                                                 
13 An update of Hofstede’s scores based on both institutional traditions and economic conditions of a country. 
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al. (1999), later used by several other authors, such as Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Bates et 
al. (2017) and García-Teruel et al. (2018). Specifically, for each company in a given year, 
we calculate the standard deviation of the cash flow of the last 10 years of data. Each 
company must have at least 3 years of data. Therefore, for each year we take the average 
cash flow standard deviation for each two-digit SIC code, and use this industry average 
as the measure of cash-flow volatility. 
 
iii) Firm Size (FSIZE) 
 Related to the precautionary motive, Opler et al. (2009) state that larger firms are more 
likely to be able to liquidate their non-core assets in order to obtain cash. Considering 
that these larger firms are also subject to fewer restrictions and more growth 
opportunities, its marginal bankruptcy cost is lower (Myers, 1977). Therefore, according 
to the precautionary motive to hold cash, firm size is negatively related to cash holdings. 
Based on the transaction model of Miller and Orr (1966), larger firms have economies 
of scale associated with transaction costs. This means that big firms tend to have lower 
costs of raising external capital than small firms. Hence, a negative relation is also 
predicted by the transaction motive. Accordingly, a negative relation is expected between 
firm size and cash holdings. Following the literature, we use as a proxy to firm size the 
natural logarithm of sales. 
 
iv) Leverage (LEV) 
According to the empirical evidence (e.g. Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira 
and Vilela, 2004; Bates et al., 2009) firms decrease their cash levels as the leverage 
increases. The bankruptcy risk of a firm is increasing along with the level of leverage, 
considering that it becomes more difficult to raise additional debt. Therefore, according 
to the precautionary motive firms should hold more cash to avoid the possibility of 
financial distress (Guney et al., 2007). On the other hand, high leverage ratios could 
indicate a good relationship with creditors, which represents lower costs of additional 
financing. Thereby, firms can borrow debt as a solution when facing cash shortages. 
Thus, under the precautionary motive cash holdings has a positive relation to leverage 
while is negatively related under the transaction motive. Indeed, some authors interpret 
this as a non-linear relation between leverage and cash holdings since evidence shows 
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that firms should hold more cash in response to higher levels of debt, while high levels 
of debt could indicate a good creditor spread, therefore requiring lower levels of cash.  
Based on Guney et al. (2007) we expect a negative relation with the coefficient of leverage 
and a positive relation with the squared variable. According to the majority of authors 
(Kim et al., 1998; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Bates et al., 2009; 
Dennis and McKeon, 2017) as proxy for leverage, the ratio of total debt (long-term debt 
plus short-term debt) to total assets will be used. In order to control for a non-linear 
relation a squared term will be added (Guney et al., 2007). 
 
v) Investment Opportunities (INVOP) 
Several studies (e.g. Kim et al., 1998; Opler et. al, 1999; Bates et al., 2009) provide 
evidence that investment opportunities positively affect cash holdings. Companies with 
better investment opportunities tend to hold more cash due to the higher costs of 
external finance (Opler et al., 1999). Therefore, they experience higher costs of cash 
shortage. Essentially, cash shortage in a firm combined with an increase in investment 
opportunities means that managers have to give up on profitable projects. Given this, a 
positive relationship is expected either under the precautionary motive or under the 
transaction motive. In order to measure the variable investment opportunities, the 
market-to-book ratio will be used as a proxy (Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; 
Dennis and McKeon, 2017). The market-to-book ratio is computed as the ratio of the 
book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity over 
the book value of assets. 
 
vi) Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) 
Capital Expenditures are usually used to acquire, maintain or upgrade the physical assets 
of a firm. Therefore, firms incur in capital expenditures to have future benefits (Bates et 
al., 2009). The relation between capital expenditures and cash holdings is ambiguous 
since it can be seen as a proxy for debt capacity, distress costs or for investment 
opportunities. Considering the former, since capital expenditures translate into more 
assets the debt capacity of a firm increases (Stulz, 2007). According to the precautionary 
motive, this would decrease the demand for cash from these firms. Further, Riddick and 
Whited (2009) show that a productivity shock that causes an increase in investment may 
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temporarily reduce the cash holdings of firms.  On the other hand, as a proxy for financial 
distress costs and/or investment opportunities it would be positively related to cash 
holdings (Bates et al., 2009). Therefore, the expected relation between capital 
expenditures and cash holdings is ambiguous. Based on previous empirical studies (Bates 
et al., 2009; Dudley and Zhang, 2016) CAPEX is measured through the ratio of capital 
expenditures to book value of assets. 
 
vii) Dividend Payments (DIV) 
According to Bates et al. (2009), the payment of dividends issues a positive signal for the 
public, which denotes that these firms have greater access to the capital markets. In 
addition, they tend to be less risky (Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). As result, 
the precautionary motive predicts a negative relationship between the amount of cash 
and the payment of dividends. On the side of the transaction motive, Bates et al. (2009) 
state that dividend-paying firms, when facing a shortage of cash, are able to raise funds 
at a lower cost by reducing their dividends payment. This means that the transaction 
motive also predicts a negative relation. Hence, a dividend dummy variable will be 
included to distinguish whether firms pays dividends. It will be assigned a value of  “0” 
if the firm does not pay dividends in a given year and “1” otherwise (Ferreira and Vilela, 
2004; Dennis and McKeon, 2017). 
 
viii) R&D Intensity (RDI) 
R&D intensity can influence cash holdings through two dimensions. First, a slowdown 
in the program of R&D has negative consequences for the firm due to its costs (Brown 
and Peterson, 2011). Second, as Dennis and McKeon (2017) documented, many firms 
with high R&D intensity also report negative cash flows14. R&D is a cash expense that 
firms reporting losses needs to cover. However, given the lower asset tangibility, R&D 
investments have a higher financing cost using external capital than capital expenditures. 
Therefore, according to the precautionary motive firms with higher R&D intensity 
should hold more cash to create a buffer against future shocks of cash flows. Following 
Dennis and McKeon (2017) this dummy variable takes the value of “1” when Research 
                                                 
14 Firms with higher levels of R&D that report negative cash flows needs to cover this investment, usually 
through cash holdings. 
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and Development Expenses divided by the Total Assets is higher than 0.02. Otherwise, 
the dummy variable assumes a value of “0”. 
 
ix) Negative Cash Flows (CFNEG) 
Finally, a negative cash flow dummy is also included in order to control for firms 
reporting losses. This dummy variable assumes a value of “1” when firms have negative 
operating cash flows, and a value of “0” otherwise (Dennis and McKeon, 2017).  
 
Considering the cultural variables, we use four dimensions15 to test the influence on firms 
reporting losses. Evidence proves that these dimensions influence corporate cash holdings 
(Chang and Noorbakhsh, 2009; Chen et al., 2015). Therefore, in order to test the above 
hypothesis, we use from Hofstede’s study the following cultural dimensions: Individualism 
(IDV), Masculinity (MAS), Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) and Long-Term Orientation (LTO).  
 
4.3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
In table 2 the descriptive statistics for each of the main variables used in our study are 
displayed.  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std.Dev. Observations 
CASH 0.1580 0.1067 0.7755 0.0010 0.1605 335,355 
CASH_2 0.3298 0.2332 2.0943 0.0024 0.3464 335,355 
CFLOW 0.0441 0.0645 0.3122 -0.7845 0.1475 335,355 
CFMAGN -0.0309 0.0000 0.0000 -0.7845 0.1133 335,355 
ICFVOL 0.0950 0.0635 0.5015 0.0143 0.0899 335,355 
FSIZE 12.3087 12.2031 17.2940 8.0107 1.8941 335,355 
FSIZE_2 12.0605 12.0811 17.0769 5.3132 2.1341 335,355 
LEV 0.2190 0.1957 0.7089 0.0000 0.1823 335,355 
LEV2 0.0812 0.0383 0.5025 0.0000 0.1066 335,355 
INVOP 1.5128 1.1511 7.4812 0.4513 1.1239 335,355 
CAPEX 0.0912 0.0726 0.4104 0.0022 0.0751 335,355 
I(DIV) 0.6122 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4872 335,355 
                                                 
15 These dimensions range from 0 to 100, with higher scores meaning a greater influence of a specific dimension 
in a certain country. Considering the difference in scale among Hofstede's dimensions and financial variables, 
we scaled cultural variables by 100. 
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I(RDI) 0.1904 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.3926 335,355 
IDV 0.5636 0.4800 0.9100 0.1200 0.2806 335,355 
MAS 0.6119 0.6200 0.9500 0.0500 0.1956 335,355 
UAI 0.5877 0.4800 1.1200 0.0800 0.2370 335,355 
LTO 0.5733 0.5113 1.0000 0.1310 0.2674 335,355 
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the sample over the period 1992 to 2016. The dependent variable is CASH, 
computed as cash and cash equivalents over total assets. CASH_2 is measured as the ratio of cash and cash equivalents 
over net assets, where net assets is the difference between total assets and cash and cash equivalents. CFLOW is the ratio 
pre-tax profits plus depreciation over total assets. CFMAGN is the interaction of an indicator of negative cash flow dummy 
with cash flow. ICFVOL is the cash flow standard deviation for each two-digit SIC code, computed based on the average 
of the cash flow standard deviation of the previous five years. FSIZE is the natural logarithm of sales. FSIZE_2 is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets. LEV2 is the squared term of leverage. INVOP 
is the ratio of the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity over the book value 
of assets. CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to the book value of assets I(DIV) is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if the firm pays dividends and is set to zero otherwise. I(RDI) is a dummy variable set to 1 if the ratio of 
research and development over total assets is higher than 0.02, and is set to 0 otherwise. IDV is Hofstede’s individualism 
index. MAS is Hofstede’s masculinity index. UAI is Hofstede’s uncertainty-avoidance index. LTO is Hofstede’s long-term 
orientation index. 
 
Concerning the dependent variable Cash Ratio, the average value says that our sample firms 
hold on average about 15.80% of their assets in cash. The literature presents some results 
that differ from ours, such as the values reported by Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) for UK listed 
firms (9.9%) and the cash ratio of 8.1% for US public firms reported by Ditmar et al. (2003). 
However these differences occur due to the international scope of these studies. Actually, 
considering studies for several countries our results are consistent, as for example the case 
of Chang and Noorbakhsh (2009) who reported an average value of 15.26%. Moreover, the 
results are slightly different when comparing an alternative measure, the ratio of cash to net 
assets. Considering this measure, our results show that firms hold an average cash ratio of 
32.98% of total net assets (table B.4), which is quite different from the results of Opler et al. 
(1999), Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Chang and Noorbakhsh (2009) and Chen et al. (2015). For 
example, Opler et al. (1999) found a mean value of 17% for US firms, while Chang and 
Noorbakhsh found a mean of 15% for an international sample. This difference in results is 
explained by the different data sample periods of each study. As an example, Chang and 
Noorbakhsh (2009) data is from 1995 to 2004, while the data period in Ozkan and Ozkan 
(2004) ranges from 1984 to 1999. 
 
 
29 
Nonetheless, the average cash ratio changes according to the sign of the cash flow. As it 
possible to see in table 3, firms in the first decile of cash flow hold 18.25% of their assets in 
cash, while firms between the third and tenth decile only hold 16.53%. Indeed, according to 
our results, we found that cash is higher in the first cash flow decile and in the ninth and 
tenth decile, represennting 18.98% and 23.28% respectively.  
Table 3: Average cash holdings by cash flow decile 
The table report the evolution of average cash holdings by cash flow deciles for the sample of 335,355 firm-year 
observations, from 1992 to 2016. Values are an average over firm-year observations within each decile. 
 Cash Flow decile  
Year 1 2 3-10  Total 
1992 0.1320 0.1051 0.1272 0.1257 
1993 0.1928 0.1215 0.1357 0.1370 
1994 0.2281 0.1388 0.1309 0.1355 
1995 0.2219 0.1406 0.1283 0.1329 
1996 0.2672 0.1270 0.1256 0.1337 
1997 0.2570 0.1289 0.1250 0.1350 
1998 0.2354 0.1197 0.1241 0.1339 
1999 0.2247 0.1204 0.1250 0.1339 
2000 0.2362 0.1268 0.1280 0.1396 
2001 0.2404 0.1261 0.1254 0.1412 
2002 0.2576 0.1425 0.1336 0.1531 
2003 0.2668 0.1476 0.1444 0.1605 
2004 0.2819 0.1583 0.1519 0.1663 
2005 0.2868 0.1530 0.1513 0.1662 
2006 0.2888 0.1597 0.1512 0.1670 
2007 0.2918 0.1635 0.1513 0.1682 
2008 0.2376 0.1452 0.1423 0.1563 
2009 0.2404 0.1486 0.1581 0.1686 
2010 0.2650 0.1561 0.1613 0.1721 
2011 0.2611 0.1541 0.1589 0.1698 
2012 0.2268 0.1437 0.1608 0.1657 
2013 0.1890 0.1399 0.1633 0.1631 
2014 0.1837 0.1356 0.1628 0.1615 
2015 0.1805 0.1347 0.1681 0.1655 
2016 0.1825 0.1454 0.1653 0.1645 
 
Being positive cash flow an inflow of funds, it is clear to understand the relation between 
cash and cash flow in the last two deciles. Nonetheless, having more cash in the lowest decile 
could represent a precaution against the unpredictable future cash flows. According to the 
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table 4, cash holdings from firms reporting losses increased by roughly 39% from 1992 to 
2016, while firms with positive cash flows increased around 30%.  
Table 4: Average cash holdings by the sign of cash flow 
The table report the evolution of average cash holdings by the sign of cash flow for the sample of 335,355 firm-year 
observations, from 1992 to 2016. Values are an average over firm-year observations within each decile. 
 
                                    Cash Flow 
Year           Neg. Cash Flow               Pos. Cash Flow 
1992   0.1153   0.1272 
1993   0.1451   0.1357 
1994   0.1670   0.1309 
1995   0.1648   0.1283 
1996   0.1861   0.1256 
1997   0.1886   0.1250 
1998   0.1736   0.1241 
1999   0.1692   0.1250 
2000   0.1823   0.1280 
2001   0.1865   0.1254 
2002   0.2053   0.1336 
2003   0.2125   0.1444 
2004   0.2276   0.1519 
2005   0.2290   0.1513 
2006   0.2318   0.1512 
2007   0.2370   0.1513 
2008   0.1979   0.1423 
2009   0.1965   0.1581 
2010 0.2138 0.1613 
2011 0.2109 0.1589 
2012 0.1843 0.1608 
2013 0.1621 0.1633 
2014 0.1543 0.1628 
2015 0.1536 0.1681 
2016 0.1602 0.165 
Average Increase 38.98% 29.90% 
 
Looking at the explanatory variable, cash flow shows an average value of 0.044, which is 
below the value of Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Chang and 
Noorbakhsh (2009) and Chen et al. (2015) . Regarding this, the analysis of the mean values 
of cash flows during our sample period (Table 5) shows that the magnitude of negative cash 
flows (decile 1 and 2) become, on average, higher between 2012 and 2016 when compared 
with the first period (1992-1996).  
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Table 5: Cash Flow by decile 
The table report the evolution of average cash flows by deciles formed annually. The sample is 335,355 firm-year 
observations, from 1992 to 2016. Values are an average over firm-year observations within each decile. 
Cash Flow decile 1992-1996 1997-2001 2002-2006 2007-2011 2012-2016 
1 -0.2356 -0.3008 -0.3130 -0.3007 -0.2467 
2 -0.0114 -0.0161 -0.0181 -0.0187 -0.0167 
3 0.0229 0.0233 0.0237 0.0236 0.0240 
4 0.0418 0.0418 0.0418 0.0419 0.0418 
5 0.0571 0.0571 0.0571 0.0571 0.0570 
6 0.0724 0.0723 0.0723 0.0723 0.0721 
7 0.0892 0.0891 0.0890 0.0890 0.0889 
8 0.1095 0.1095 0.1094 0.1095 0.1093 
9 0.1391 0.1391 0.1389 0.1391 0.1387 
10 0.2051 0.2137 0.2173 0.2183 0.2160 
 
Actually, during this period also the average cash flow decrease from 0.71 to 0.52 for all the 
sample firms. It is also interesting to notice that the magnitude of negative cash flows sustains 
the biggest values from 2002 until 2011, which the period usually denoted as pre-crisis and 
the crisis peak period. The explanatory variable size, measured as the logarithm of sales, 
reports a mean value of 12.06. This mean is almost equal to the firm size mean value 
measured as the logarithm of total asset (12.31%). For this variable, Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) 
reported a value of 10.87 for its UK sample firms, which is close to our results. In opposite, 
Opler et al. (1999) got a mean of 4.59. This difference can be justified by the increase in firm 
size over the last years. The average value of the variable leverage is 0.22, while the squared 
term has a mean of 0.08. Actually, this value is in line with several authors (e.g. Opler et al., 
1999; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Bates et al., 2009) which reports values around 0.20 and 0.25. 
Then, the variable investment opportunity has a mean value of 1.51. Once again, this value 
is in line with the majority of previous results (Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; 
Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Regarding the variable Capital Expenditures, we got a mean value 
of 0.09. 
Finally, the national culture dimensions, which are steady during the period under analysis, 
are in the range of 5 to 112, being uncertainty-avoidance the variable with greater amplitude. 
The median value of individualism is 56 for our sample, the highest value of 91 belongs to 
U.S.A. while the lowest value of 12 belongs to Venezuela. Mean Masculinity is 61. Masculinity 
values ranges from 95 (Japan) to Sweden (5). For uncertainty avoidance the median is 59, 
with the highest value of 112 reported by Greece, while the lowest of 8 is from Singapore. 
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The long-term orientation dimension score a mean of 57. The highest score (100) is from 
South Korea and the lowest score (13) is from Colombia. 
 
4.4. Methodology 
 
Panel data is a type of dataset that contains both cross-sectional and time series dimension. 
This combination of data allows the incorporation in the study of several units explained 
over a period of time, rather than in a single moment. Therefore, it is a more informative 
data, with more variability and less collinearity among variables, allowing control for 
individual heterogeneity (Baltagi, 2008). 
Commonly when dealing with panel data authors use the Pooled OLS regression, such as the 
case of Ferreira and Vilela (2004) and Bates et al. (2009). Pooled OLS ignores the panel 
structure of the data and simply estimate a pooled regression for all firms in the sample. 
Preserving the variation in the data comes at the cost of potentially biased coefficients. In 
this regard, we could have external factors that exert influence on cash holdings that cannot 
be observed or even measured (Wooldridge, 2015). These alone would not pose a problem 
because these factors are reflected on the error term, however if these unobserved factors 
are correlated with both the dependent and the independent variables the estimators will 
become biased and inconsistent. Indeed, Peterson (2009) shows that in the presence of time 
effects and/or fixed effect the pooled OLS regression is biased.  
The most used panel data methods that take into account these unobserved factors are the 
fixed-effect model and the random-effect model, which are distinguishable based on the 
relation between the firm-specific unobserved factors and the explanatory variable (Kim et 
al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Harford et al., 2008; Bates et al., 2009). 
The fixed-effect model control for the effects of time-invariant variables, while the random-
effect model assumes that the unobserved variables are uncorrelated with all the observed 
variables. The fixed-effect model assumes that the time-invariant characteristics should not 
be correlated with other individual characteristics. In this model the unobserved firm-specific 
effects are removed, taking into account the firm-specific unobserved fixed effects. 
However, also the explanatory variables that are constant over time are excluded. Therefore, 
this model becomes inappropriate when the key explanatory variable is time-invariant. Unlike 
the fixed-effects model, the random-effect model includes the time-variant variables, 
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assuming that the variation across entities is random and uncorrelated with the independent 
variables.  
Another way used in finance by researchers to address both firm and time effects is to apply 
year dummies for each period and then cluster by firm, considering that we have more firms 
than years in the sample. However, if the time effect is not fixed, the time dummies will not 
be capable to remove completely the dependence (Peterson, 2009). Peterson (2009) also 
argue that even standard errors clustered by firm can be biased. Consequently, when there 
are enough clusters in each dimension the author defend that double clustering produces 
unbiased standard errors and correctly sized confidence intervals. In line with this, Gow et 
al. (2010) provide evidence that cluster by both firm and time produces well-specified test 
statistics in all the form of dependence tested (cross-sectional and time-series dependence).  
Based on Peterson (2009)16, we find in untabulated results that our data suffer from firm 
effect and time effect. Considering these findings, we will address the double-clustered model 
in our econometric model. 
In order to get an empirical view on the research questions, two empirical models are present 
below. Thus, the first one (4.3.1) will include standard variables affecting both the 
precautionary and transaction motive to hold cash. To capture the effect of losses on firms’ 
cash policy we add an indicator of negative operating cash flows. In addition, an interaction 
term between this variable and cash flows is added to capture the magnitude of the losses 
(Dennis and McKeon, 2017). According to Denis and McKeon (2017) this term is an option 
to deal with the convexity in the relation between cash holdings and cash flow, allowing to 
make interpretations of the different effects of negative and positive cash flow firms. Lastly, 
since we predict a nonlinearity in the association between leverage and cash holdings, one 
squared term is added to the regression: 
                                                 
16 Peterson (2009) prove the presence of firm effect in the data if the standard errors clustered by firm are three 
to four times larger than the White standard errors. When the White Standard errors are two to three times 
larger than the standard errors clustered by time, the data suffer from time effect (Peterson, 2009). In addition, 
if the standard errors clustered by firm and time are larger than the standard errors clustered by just one 
dimension, there is both time and firm effect (Peterson, 2009). 
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𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐶𝐹𝑁𝐸𝐺 × 𝐶𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐼𝐶𝐹𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉
2
𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡+𝛽9𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 
 
In addition to the standard variables affecting both the precautionary and transaction motive 
to hold cash, the second model (4.3.2) will use the cultural dimensions as presented by 
Hofstede (1980, 2001): 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐶𝐹𝑁𝐸𝐺 × 𝐶𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐼𝐶𝐹𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉
2
𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡+𝛽9𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐿𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 
 
Moreover, in order to test the impact of negative cash flows on cultural variables, we 
introduce an interaction term between each Hofstede’s dimension (1980, 2001) and the 
variable Cash Flow Magnitude. 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐶𝐹𝑁𝐸𝐺 × 𝐶𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐼𝐶𝐹𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉
2
𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡+𝛽9𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐿𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽16(𝐶𝐹𝑀𝐴𝐺𝑁 × 𝐼𝐷𝑉)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽17(𝐶𝐹𝑀𝐴𝐺𝑁 × 𝑀𝐴𝑆)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽18(𝐶𝐹𝑀𝐴𝐺𝑁 × 𝑈𝐴𝐼)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽19(𝐶𝐹𝑀𝐴𝐺𝑁 × 𝐿𝑇𝑂)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 
 
Where 𝑖 stands for firm, 𝑡 denotes specific year within the sample period and 𝜇 is the error 
term.  
Concerning the regression, the double-clustered model is robust to heteroscedasticity. In 
table 6, we report Pearson correlation coefficient between the main explanatory variables. 
The correlations that we got are not significantly high, which means that there is no 
collinearity between two explanatory variables. To exclude the hypothesis of the presence of 
4.3.1 
4.3.2 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.3 
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collinearity we further perform the variance inflation factor (table B.3) among the main 
explanatory variables. Since the values are below 10 there are no concerning about corrective 
measures (Wooldridge, 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
The table report the outputs of the Pearson correlation coefficients for our main variables. All the variables are significant at the 5% percent level. 
  CASH CFLOW I(CFNEG) ICFVOL FSIZE LEV INVOP CAPEX I(DIV) I(RDI) IDV MAS UAI LTO 
CASH 1                     
CFLOW -0.1408 1                    
I(CFNEG) 0.1311 -0.6917 1            
ICFVOL 0.2139 -0.2536 0.2696 1                  
FSIZE -0.2345 0.3741 -0.3792 -0.2906 1                 
LEV -0.4135 -0.0529 0.0330 -0.1807 0.2008 1                
INVOP 0.2990 -0.0259 0.0590 0.1801 -0.0918 -0.2002 1               
CAPEX -0.1505 0.0672 -0.0144 0.1079 -0.0041 0.0871 0.0851 1       
I(DIV) -0.0827 0.3285 -0.3792 -0.3203 0.3897 -0.0394 -0.0657 -0.0577 1      
I(RDI) 0.2547 -0.0886 0.0844 0.1295 -0.0143 -0.1777 0.2079 -0.0105 -0.1004 1     
IDV 0.0163 -0.0894 0.1006 0.3810 0.0197 -0.0842 0.1665 0.1590 -0.2246 0.1382 1    
MAS 0.0720 -0.0283 -0.0432 -0.1504 0.1517 -0.0203 -0.0557 -0.1239 0.1479 0.0473 0.0970 1   
UAI -0.0071 0.0323 -0.0794 -0.3036 0.1596 0.0650 -0.1839 -0.1219 0.1675 0.0091 -0.2544 0.3927 1  
LTO 0.0369 0.0701 -0.1215 -0.4246 0.1347 0.0471 -0.1657 -0.1842 0.2932 -0.0097 -0.6767 0.2817 0.5099 1 
 vi 
 
 
4.4.1. Financial Constraints Criteria 
 
Following Almeida et al. (2004), Kaplan and Zingales (1997), and Whited and Wu (2006), 
financial constraints influence the way firms manage their cash holdings. To explore the issue 
we implement several financial constraints proxies. The literature suggests a number of 
measures, however critics identifying a variety of problems with these approaches (see, for 
instance, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist., 2016)17.  Considering that we do not have a study 
addressing these problems, we use from the literature (e.g. Almeida et al., 2004; Whited and 
Wu, 2006) four alternative measures to partition our sample: 
 
i) KZ Index: Rather than using a model based on a single firm characteristic, the measure 
developed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) is used. The KZ Index collectively determines 
the firm as constrained or unconstrained based on the profitability, growth opportunities, 
leverage ratio and cash holdings. 
𝐾𝑍 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = −1.002 × 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 + 0.283 × 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄 + 3.139 × 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
− 39.368 × 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 − 1.315 × 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 
 
Firms in the bottom (top) three deciles of the KZ Index are ranked as financially 
unconstrained (constrained). The ranking is performed in an annual basis. 
 
ii) WW Index: Unlike the KZ Index, the Whited and Wu index (2006) uses firm 
characteristics factors associated with external finance constraints. The index is 
computed as follows: 
𝑊𝑊 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = −0.091 × 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 − 0.062 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 0.021𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔
− 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 − 0.044 × 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 0.102 × 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ
− 0.035 × 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 
                                                 
17 Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016) find that firms denoted as constrained are not constrained in their ability 
to access external funds. The “evidence suggests that extant findings that have been attributed to constraints 
may instead reflect differences in the growth and financing policies of firms that find themselves at different 
stages of their lifecycles.” (Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2016) 
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Firms in the bottom (top) three deciles of the WW Index are classified as financially 
unconstrained (constrained). The ranking is performed in an annual basis. 
 
iii) Firm Size: Based on the argument that smaller firms have more difficult to obtain 
external finance given that they are typically younger and smaller, we rank firms based 
on their size in an annual basis over the sample period (Almeida et al., 2004). Firms are 
assigned as constrained (unconstrained) if they are in the bottom (top) three deciles of 
the size distribution. 
 
iv) Dividend Payout Ratio: According to Fazzari et al. (1998) we rank firms according to 
the dividend payout ratio. The literature states that unconstrained firms are likely to pay 
higher amount of dividends as compared to constrained firms (Almeida et al., 2004). 
Therefore we rank firms as constrained (unconstrained) if those firms are in the bottom 
(top) three deciles of the annual payout ratio. The payout ratio is computed as the ratio 
of total dividends to operating income.  
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5. Empirical Results 
 
In this section, we present the results from the analysis. We divide the section in four 
subsections. Aiming to know which motive best explain the behavior of firms, the first 
subsection represents the basic empirical model for cash holdings. In the second subsection, 
we introduce the national culture dimensions in order to access the effect on the cash ratio.  
In addition, in subsection three we measure the impact of financial constraints in firms 
reporting losses. Lastly, we present our robustness checks for the equation (4.3.1.) and 
equation (4.3.2.). 
 
5.1. Cash Holdings Empirical Model 
 
The empirical analysis start with the debate whether the firm characteristics discussed in 
section 4 affect cash holdings, explaining which motive best explains the behavior of loss-
making firms’ in terms of cash policy. In table 7, we report results from double-clustered 
model for the full sample of 335,355 firm-year observations, distinguishing those reporting 
negative cash flows. 
 
Table 7: Estimation Output of equation (4.3.1) 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 0.2876*** 0.2790*** 0.2754*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0050) 
CFLOWt -0.0819*** 0.0657*** 0.0659*** 
 (0.0071) (0.0250) (0.0233) 
CFMAGNt  -0.2003*** -0.1945*** 
  (0.0277) (0.0270) 
I(CFNEG)t  0.0045**  
  (0.0021)  
I(CFNEG)t-3   0.0278*** 
   (0.0048) 
ICFVOLt 0.1151*** 0.1063*** 0.0979*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0117) (0.0115) 
FSIZEt -0.0058*** -0.0057*** -0.0053*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
LEVt -0.7522*** -0.7358*** -0.7356*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0104) 
LEV2t 0.8602*** 0.8487*** 0.8489*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0131) 
INVOPt 0.0252*** 0.0223*** 0.0219*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0016) 
CAPEXt -0.2815*** -0.3210*** -0.3189*** 
 (0.0091) (0.0096) (0.0097) 
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I(DIV)t 0.0081*** 0.0067*** 0.0073*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0018) 
I(RDI)t 0.0575*** 0.0571*** 0.0568*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
R-squared 0.3286 0.3309 0.3320 
F-Statistic 11793.08 11799.41 9771.89 
Observations 335,355 335,355 335,355 
 
Table 7 presents output estimation of the base empirical model (4.3.1.) Double-Clustered Model (column 1, 2 and 3).).The 
dependent variable is CASHt, computed as cash and cash equivalents over total assets. CFLOWt is the ratio pre-tax profits 
plus depreciation over total assets. CFMAGNt is the interaction of an indicator of negative cash flow dummy with cash 
flow. I(CFNEG)t is a dummy variable set to one when cash flow is negative, and set to 0 otherwise. I(CFNEG)t-3t is a 
dummy variable set to one when cash flow is negative in the previous three years, and set to 0 otherwise. ICFVOLt is the 
cash flow standard deviation for each two-digit SIC code, computed based on the average of the cash flow standard 
deviation  of the previous five years. FSIZEt is the natural logarithm of sales. LEVt is the ratio of total total debt to total 
assets. LEV2t is the squared term of leverage. INVOPt is the ratio of the book value of assets minus the book value of equity 
plus the market value of equity over the book value of assets. CAPEXt is the ratio of capital expenditures to the book value 
of assets. I(DIV)t is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm pay dividends and is set to zero otherwise. 
I(RDI)t is a dummy variable set to 1 if the ratio of research and development over total assets is higher than 0.02, and is set 
to 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors to heteroscedasticity are reported in parenthesis under each coefficient. Statistically 
significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 
The results support strong evidence of the effect of both transaction and precautionary 
motive on cash reserves for loss firms, confirming that the sign of the cash flow have an 
impact on firms’ cash policy. Nonetheless, the precautionary motive has the power to best 
explain the behavior of firms reporting losses. The variables applied in the model are 
significant at one-percent level. An exception is the dummy variable of negative cash flows, 
which is significant at five-percent level (column 2). 
The variable Size (FSIZEt) has the expected relation predicted by the precautionary and 
transaction motive. The relation confirms that the size is negatively correlated with cash ratio, 
considering that these firms are able to easily access cash, through the sale of their non-core 
assets or even through economies of scale when recurring to the capital markets. (Opler et 
al., 1999; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Dennis and McKeon, 2017). 
The cash flow variable is negative and significant in the column (1). However, when adding 
the indicator of negative values for cash flow and the interaction term to capture the 
magnitude of losses (column 2), the variable turns to positive. This shows that forcing the 
cash flow variable into a linear relation with cash holdings jeopardizes the model.  This non-
linear relation confirms findings of previous studies (e.g. Denis and McKeon, 2017), showing 
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that large positive cash flows are penalized in predictions of cash ratios. In sum, the relation 
between cash flow and cash holdings is dependent on the sign of cash flows. 
The expected association between industry cash flow volatility (ICFVOLt) and cash level is 
positive, reinforcing the notion that firms with higher levels of volatility have higher cash 
ratios due to the bigger exposure to cash flow shocks and liquidity risk (Acharya et al., 2014). 
Indeed, this is in accordance with the precautionary motive. 
The variable leverage has effect on the risk of business, being a proxy for the capacity of 
firms to resort to the capital markets (credit spread) in case of need. We got results for both 
variables that are in accordance with the findings of Guney et al. (2007). Thus, our regression 
shows a negative association between cash holdings and leverage (LEVt) and a positive 
relation between cash holdings and the squared term of leverage (LEV2t). This shows that 
for lower levels of leverage, firms have more ability to access external markets, while highly 
leverage firms have more cash due to a higher risk of financial distress (Guney et al, 2007). 
The result that we got from the relation between investment opportunities (INVOPt) and 
cash confirm previous findings of several researchers (e.g. Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira and 
Vilela, 2004; Bates et al. 2009) and supports the transaction and precautionary motive. This 
confirms the argument that firms should prevent a cash shortage to avoid loss valuable 
investment opportunities and the need to recur to external funds. An increase of 1 percent 
in the variable investment opportunities (INVOPt) result in an increase by 0.0223 percent of 
the cash ratio. 
Following the studies of Bates et al. (2009) and Denis and McKeon (2017) we also find a 
negative relationship between cash holdings and capital expenditures. This relation is 
supported by the precautionary motive as more assets translate in an increase of debt 
capacity, therefore decreasing the demand for cash (Bates et al., 2009). The dummy variable 
dividend is significant and has a negative association to cash, opposite to the relation found 
in previous studies (Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2001; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Bates et al., 
2009). A possible justification to firms hold larger amounts of cash is that dividend payers 
try to avoid a dividend cut due to costly signaling to the market (Drobetz and Grüninger, 
2007). 
Lastly, the dummy variable R&D intensity has the predicted association with cash. This 
means that companies with higher R&D intensity should hold more cash in order to avoid 
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consequences of negative effects of shocks in cash flows (Dennis and McKeon, 2017). The 
following table 3 presents the estimation output of equation (4.3.1.). 
In column (3) we present the results with the inclusion of an additional variable, namely 
representing the persistence of negative cash flows. The variable shows a positive relation 
and significant relation with the dependent variable cash ratio. In line with Dennis and 
Mckeon (2017), this might indicate that the persistence of negative cash flows creates an 
additional precautionary demand for cash. 
 
5.2. Effect of National Culture 
Concerning the analysis of the national culture, we re-run the equation including four 
Hofstede dimensions: Individualism, Masculinity, Uncertainty-Avoidance and Long-Term 
Orientation. The following table 8 presents the estimation outputs:  
 
Table 8: Estimation output of equation (4.3.2.) and (4.3.3.) 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 0.2011*** 0.2593*** 0.2010*** 0.2601*** 
 (0.0080) (0.0049) (0.0079) (0.0047) 
CFLOWt 0.1530*** 0.1498*** 0.1431*** 0.1325*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0237) (0.0246) (0.0229) 
CFMAGNt -0.2932*** -0.1258*** -0.2829*** -0.2636*** 
 (0.0299) (0.0357) (0.0296) (0.0273) 
I(CFNEG)t 0.0083*** 0.0127*** 
 
  
(0.0019) (0.0020) 
 
 
I(CFNEG)t-3 
 
 0.0258*** -0.0269*** 
  
 (0.0049) (0.0094) 
ICFVOLt 0.2124*** 0.1875*** 0.2049*** 0.1774*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0107) (0.0088) (0.0101) 
FSIZEt -0.0054*** -0.0049*** -0.0051*** -0.0048*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
LEVt -0.7145*** -0.7155*** -0.7159*** -0.7167*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0105) (0.0104) 
LEV2t 0.8220*** 0.8234*** 0.8247*** 0.8250*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0139) 
INVOPt 0.0234*** 0.0235*** 0.0231*** 0.0234*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0017) 
CAPEXt -0.2898*** -0.2901*** -0.2869*** -0.2856*** 
 (0.0099) (0.0092) (0.0099) (0.0095) 
I(DIV)t -0.0055*** -0.0048*** -0.0053*** -0.0046*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0015) 
I(RDI)t 0.0531*** 0.0546*** 0.0529*** 0.0548***  
(0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
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IDV -0.0235***  -0.0238***   
(0.0038)  (0.0037)  
MAS 0.0526***  0.0520***   
(0.0054)  (0.0054)  
UAI 0.0050  0.0042   
(0.0059)  (0.0059)  
LTO 0.0634***  0.0631***   
(0.0039)  (0.0039)  
IDV_M  -0.0396***  -0.0385***  
 (0.0033)  (0.0032) 
MAS_M  0.0096***  0.0101***  
 (0.0017)  (0.0017) 
UAI_M  0.0198***  0.0202***  
 (0.0031)  (0.0030) 
LTO_M  0.0046***  0.0030*  
 (0.0016)  (0.0017) 
IDV_M*CFMAGNt  -0.1643***  0.0653*** 
  (0.0168)  (0.0064) 
MAS_M*CFMAGNt  -0.0474***  0.0164*** 
  (0.0135)  (0.0063) 
UAI_M*CFMAGNt  0.0003  -0.0044 
  (0.0192)  (0.0075) 
LTO_M*CFMAGNt  0.0510***  -0.0108 
    (0.0140)   (0.0079) 
R-squared 0.3506 0.3530 0.3514 0.3527 
F-Statistic 8262.53 6610.07 8268.68 6602.41 
Observations 335,355 335,355 335,355 335,355 
 
Table 8 presents output estimation of the empirical models (4.3.2.) and (4.3.3.) through Double Clustered Model. In column 
(1) we present the equation model (4.3.2.). In column (2) we introduce the dummy variable I(CFNEG)t-3, which takes the 
value of 1 if the three previous firm’s cash flow were negative, and zero otherwise. In column (3) we include four interaction 
terms between the variable CFMAGNt and the four hofstede’s cultural dimensions. In column (4) we include four 
interaction terms between the variable CFMAGNt and the four hofstede’s cultural dimensions for firms reporting persistent 
loses. The dependent variable is CASHt, computed as cash and cash equivalents over total assets. CFLOWt is the ratio pre-
tax profits plus depreciation over total assets. CFMAGNt is the interaction of an indicator of negative cash flow dummy 
with cash flow. I(CFNEG)t is a dummy variable set to one when cash flow is negative, and set to 0 otherwise. . I(CFNEG)t-
3t is a dummy variable set to one when cash flow is negative in the previous three years, and set to 0 otherwise.  ICFVOLt 
is the cash flow standard deviation for each two-digit SIC code, computed based on the average of the cash flow standard 
deviation  of the previous five years. FSIZEt is the natural logarithm of sales. LEVt is the ratio of total total debt to total 
assets. LEV2t is the squared term of leverage. INVOPt is the ratio of the book value of assets minus the book value of equity 
plus the market value of equity over the book value of assets. CAPEXt is the ratio of capital expenditures to the book value 
of assets. I(DIV)t is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm pay dividends and is set to zero otherwise. 
I(RDI)t is a dummy variable set to 1 if the ratio of research and development over total assets is higher than 0.02, and is set 
to 0 otherwise. IDV is Hofstede’s individualism index. IDV_M is Hofstede’s individualism index that equals one for 
countries above the median, and zero otherwise. MAS is Hofstede’s masculinity index. MAS_M is Hofstede’s masculinity 
index that equals one for countries above the median, and zero otherwise. UAI is Hofstede’s uncertainty-avoidance index. 
UAI_M is Hofstede’s uncertainty-avoidance index that equals one for countries above the median, and zero otherwise. 
LTO is Hofstede’s long-term orientation index. LTO_M is Hofstede’s long-term orientation index that equals one for 
44 
countries above the median, and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors to heteroscedasticity are reported in parenthesis 
under each coefficient. Statistically significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 
Starting from the column (1), the comparison between both equation’s output shows that 
variables maintain equal statistical significance. Overall, with the inclusion of these cultural 
dimensions the coefficients’ signs for the main financial determinants of cash balances are 
also not different. The only change is the sign of the dummy variable dividend, which 
becomes negative. This relation contradicts the previous model (Table 3), showing that firms 
do not consider the signaling hypothesis. Actually, a possible justification is that dividend 
paying firms can face a shortage of cash by cutting their dividend payments (Opler et. al, 
1999; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). Indeed, this shows the ambiguous 
relation found in the literature about this variable. 
Regarding the cultural indicators, the coefficient of Individualism is statistically significant at 
the one-percent level. The magnitude of the coefficient shows that a one-unit change in 
individualism reduces cash holdings by 0.0235 percent, which is in line with our third 
hypothesis. This result is in accordance with Chen et al. (2015), which suggest that in 
individualistic countries managers are overconfident about their firm’s financial 
performance, therefore underestimating the need for cash. In similar way, in these countries 
managers tend to engage in more risky projects when they have excess cash (Chen et al., 
2015). 
Our fourth hypothesis is confirmed through the positive and statistically significant 
coefficient of masculinity. This means that firms in masculinity countries tend to hold larger 
cash ratios. This is due managers’ willingness to avoid being subject to the market analysis 
when investing in projects. So, holding more cash allow them to pursuit their investment 
projects without outside scrutiny (Chang and Noorbakhsh, 2009). 
We also find that the relation between cash holdings and uncertainty avoidance dimension is 
not statistically significant. However, the positive sign of the coefficient of Uncertainty 
Avoidance suggest that firms with more uncertainty avoidance tend to hold more cash. Our 
hypothesis defends that countries with higher levels of uncertainty avoidance tend to avoid 
the ambiguity and uncertainty about the future, hedging against future cash shortfalls through 
the accumulation of cash (Chen et al., 2015). Given that no statistical significance is found 
in the coefficient associated with, our hypothesis is not supported. 
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Lastly, the positive and statistically significant coefficient of long-term orientation lend 
support to our sixth hypothesis. This is in accordance with prior evidences that documents 
a positive relation between cash ratios and long-term orientation (Chang and Noorbakhsh, 
2009). The main features of long-term societies (e.g. patience, perseverance and willingness 
to safety) explains the managerial propensity to invest more in cash. Therefore, our results 
provide evidence that long-term societies prefer safer and long-term investments (Chang and 
Noorbakhsh, 2009). 
We also study the marginal effect of negative cash flows on firms above the median for each 
one of the cultural variables (column 2). The interaction terms are significant at the one-
percent level, except the non-significant interaction of uncertainty avoidance. Considering 
the individualism variable, it is possible to notice that negative cash flow firms in countries 
that are more individualistic have fewer cash holdings than those firms in countries below 
the median. This is the expected relation, considering the overconfidence strictly connected 
to this national culture variable. The overconfidence skew managers’ risk perception, 
reducing their demand for cash when comparing with countries with lower individualism. 
Further, the interaction between cash flow magnitude and masculinity reflects that firms in 
countries with levels of masculinity above the median hold less cash than firms in countries 
with lower levels of masculinity. Although firms in masculinity countries are more prone to 
hold larger cash holdings, this might indicate that managers do not adapt their investment 
behaviour according to the sign of cash flows. Moreover, the positive coefficient of the 
interaction term between uncertainty avoidance and cash flow magnitude is not significant 
in explaining the level of cash holdings for our sample. The table 8 also suggests that firms 
in more long-term oriented countries with negative cash flows hold more cash than firms in 
countires below the median in this dimension. To the extent that firms in long-term oriented 
countries may be overly conservative and managers tend to put less pressure on short-term 
gains, the results show that the impact of this national culture on cash holdings holds 
regardless the sign of firms’ cash flow. 
In column (3) we introduce again the variable representing the persistence of negative cash 
flows. The relation provide evidence that the persistence of negative cash flows increase the 
demand for cash, even considering the national culture. 
Lastly, the marginal effect of negative cash flows for firms reporting persistent loses is 
addressed in column (4). According to individualism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance, 
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we prove that persistent negative cash flow firms tend to hold more cash than non-persistent 
ones. The only exception is the case of long-term oriented countries, which their cash 
decreases when comparing to non-persistent negative cash flow firms. This might mean that 
managers decrease their cash holdings in order to take decisions to invert their cash flow 
sign. Indeed, as it is possible to see in column (4) the persistence of negative cash flow 
completely invert the relation of cash flow magnitude with each one of the national culture 
variables. This show the strength of cash flow in cash holdings decisions. For instance, as 
the case of column (2) the persistence of negative cash flows skew the overconfidence bias 
of firms in individualistic countries. In this case, the magnitude of impact of persistent 
negative cash flows is significant. In addition, our empirical evidence support the view that 
firms with persistent negative cash flows in masculinity countries hold more cash to be able 
to pursuit their personal decisions without any external judgment.  The interaction variable 
between cash flow magnitude and both the uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation 
is not significant in our study. 
Considering the empirical literature mentioned, individualism, masculinity and long-term 
orientation influence the cash holding decisions. Accordingly, we show through the previous 
results that the national culture have an important role in determining the level of cash 
holdings in firms reporting losses. 
 
5.2.1. Firm Risk Attributes 
 
In order to test additional effects of national culture variables, we decide to analyze further 
relations. Therefore, we examine the marginal effect of risk in cash holdings, considering the 
national cultures. To do so, we apply the interaction between cultural dimensions and two 
risk firm characteristics. We use cash flow volatility, as firms with higher volatile cash flows 
are more prone to face financial distress in the future. Considering that firms with greater 
R&D are assumed to have higher costs of financial distress, we also interact this variable with 
national culture dimensions. Actually, the literature states that firms with higher cash flow 
volatility and R&D hold more precautionary cash. Results are shown in Table 9. 
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Table 9: Estimation Output of Risk Firm Characteristics 
 Independent Variable (1) (2) 
Constant 0.2803*** 0.2481*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0046) 
CFLOWt 0.1304*** 0.1739*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0206) 
CFMAGNt -0.2338*** -0.2319*** 
 (0.0252) (0.0264) 
I(CFNEG)t 0.0111*** 0.0079***  
(0.0021) (0.0020) 
ICFVOLt  0.1918*** 
  (0.0089) 
FSIZEt -0.0049*** -0.0042*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0004) 
LEVt -0.7307*** -0.6989*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0101) 
LEV2t 0.8327*** 0.8001*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0137) 
INVOPt 0.0234*** 0.0205*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0015) 
CAPEXt -0.2816*** -0.2670*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0088) 
I(DIV)t -0.0049*** -0.0020 
 (0.0018) (0.0016) 
I(RDI)t 0.0561*** 0.0141***  
(0.0025) (0.0025) 
IDV_M -0.0399*** -0.0427***  
(0.0037) (0.0032) 
MAS_M 0.0068*** 0.0116***  
(0.0017) (0.0016) 
UAI_M 0.0136*** 0.0169***  
(0.0035) (0.0027) 
LTO_M 0.0031 0.0062*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0017) 
IDV_M*CFVOLt 0.1007*** 
 
 
(0.0131) 
 
MAS_M*CFVOLt 0.0635*** 
 
 
(0.0141) 
 
UAI_M*CFVOLt 0.0183 
 
 
(0.0264) 
 
LTO_M*CFVOLt -0.0669*** 
 
 
(0.0114) 
 
IDV_M*RDIt 
 
0.3133***   
(0.0234) 
MAS_M*RDIt 
 
0.0992***   
(0.0222) 
UAI_M*RDIt 
 
0.3411***   
(0.0304) 
LTO_M*RDIt 
 
-0.0657*** 
    (0.0220) 
R-squared 0.3472 0.3803 
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F-Statistic 6822.69 7073.54 
Observations 335,355 335,355 
 
Table 9 presents output estimation of the base empirical model (4.3.2.) through Double Clustered Model. In column (1) we 
present the equation model (4.3.2.). In column (2) we introduce the dummy variable I(CFNEG)t-3, which takes the value of 
1 if the three previous firm’s cash flow were negative, and zero otherwise. In column (3) we include four interaction terms 
between the variable CFMAGNt and the four hofstede’s cultural dimensions. The dependent variable is CASHt, computed 
as cash and cash equivalents over total assets. CFLOWt is the ratio pre-tax profits plus depreciation over total assets. 
CFMAGNt is the interaction of an indicator of negative cash flow dummy with cash flow. I(CFNEG)t is a dummy variable 
set to one when cash flow is negative, and set to 0 otherwise. . I(CFNEG)t-3t is a dummy variable set to one when cash flow 
is negative in the previous three years, and set to 0 otherwise.  ICFVOLt is the cash flow standard deviation for each two-
digit SIC code, computed based on the average of the cash flow standard deviation  of the previous five years. FSIZEt is 
the natural logarithm of sales. LEVt is the ratio of total total debt to total assets. LEV2t is the squared term of leverage. 
INVOPt is the ratio of the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity over the 
book value of assets. CAPEXt is the ratio of capital expenditures to the book value of assets. I(DIV)t is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if the firm pay dividends and is set to zero otherwise. I(RDI)t is a dummy variable set to 1 if the 
ratio of research and development over total assets is higher than 0.02, and is set to 0 otherwise. IDV_M is Hofstede’s 
individualism index that equals one for countries above the median, and zero otherwise. MAS_M is Hofstede’s masculinity 
index that equals one for countries above the median, and zero otherwise. UAI_M is Hofstede’s uncertainty-avoidance 
index that equals one for countries above the median, and zero otherwise. LTO_M is Hofstede’s long-term orientation 
index that equals one for countries above the median, and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors to heteroscedasticity are 
reported in parenthesis under each coefficient. Statistically significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 
The column (1) of the table 9 shows that the interaction variables are statistically significant 
at the one-percent level, with the exception of the non-significance of the interaction 
UAI*CFVOLt. In this regression, we decide to substitute the industry cash flow volatility by 
the firm cash flow volatility. Moreover, the coefficient of IDV*CFVOLt, MAS*CFVOLt and 
UAI* CFVOLt is positive, while the coefficient of LTO*CFVOLt is negative. Indeed, despite 
the different magnitudes of the coefficients, the results of the interactions between the 
natural culture variables and R&D are similar. These results support the hypothesis that 
individualism, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity create an additional incentive for firms 
to hold cash when either cash flow volatility or R&D expenditures rises. Hence, we conclude 
that the national culture of a country influence firm’s precautionary motive to hold cash. 
5.3. The Role of Financial Constraints 
 
We now turn our attention to the role of financial constraints on firms’ cash holdings. Table 
10 shows the estimated of equation (4.3.2.) with the sample divided according to the firms’ 
financial constraints considering four criteria: KZ Index, WW Index, Firm Size and Dividend 
Payout.  
 vi 
 
Table 10: Estimation Output of Financial Constraints 
  KZ Index WW Index Firm Size Dividend Payout 
Independent Variables Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained 
Constant -0.0553*** 0.4140*** 0.1687*** 0.2342*** 0.1445*** 0.2139*** 0.1618*** 0.2406*** 
 
(0.0063) (0.0119) (0.0226) (0.0121) (0.0212) (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0110) 
CFLOWt -0.0141 0.1397*** 0.1823*** 0.1842*** 0.2050*** 0.1287*** 0.1576*** 0.3161*** 
 
(0.0100) (0.0231) (0.0221) (0.0319) (0.0287) (0.0272) (0.0215) (0.0320) 
CFMAGNt -0.0394*** -0.2801*** -0.2970*** -0.3422*** -0.3255*** -0.2071*** -0.2704*** -0.3574*** 
 
(0.0117) (0.0290) (0.0244) (0.0370) (0.0328) (0.0282) (0.0244) (0.0406) 
I(CFNEG)t -0.0023*** 0.0292*** 0.0137*** 0.0103*** 0.0168*** 0.0076*** 0.0119*** 0.0127*** 
 
(0.0008) (0.0040) (0.0020) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0017) (0.0039) 
ICFVOLt 0.0980*** 0.1545*** 0.1851*** 0.1218*** 0.1933*** 0.1298*** 0.1997*** 0.1716*** 
 
(0.0095) (0.0160) (0.0150) (0.0129) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0107) (0.0142) 
FSIZEt 0.0026*** -0.0125*** -0.0061*** -0.0034*** -0.0039*** -0.0017** -0.0036*** -0.0052*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0006) 
LEVt 0.0706*** -0.7954*** -0.8864*** -0.4951*** -0.9299*** -0.4931*** -0.7615*** -0.7246*** 
 
(0.0124) (0.0194) (0.0200) (0.0168) (0.0204) (0.0148) (0.0171) (0.0179) 
LEV2t -0.0768*** 1.0770*** 1.0044*** 0.5536*** 1.0847*** 0.5469*** 0.8518*** 0.9702*** 
 
(0.0170) (0.0379) (0.0262) (0.0246) (0.0270) (0.0217) (0.0228) (0.0294) 
INVOPt 0.0163*** 0.0168*** 0.0261*** 0.0188*** 0.0248*** 0.0195*** 0.0279*** 0.0111*** 
 
(0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0028) (0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0014) (0.0025) 
CAPEXt 0.0258*** -0.3774*** -0.3012*** -0.2769*** -0.3124*** -0.2559*** -0.2744*** -0.3940*** 
 
(0.0050) (0.0181) (0.0115) (0.0150) (0.0126) (0.0161) (0.0094) (0.0196) 
I(DIV)t -0.0079*** -0.1049*** 0.0036 -0.0311*** 0.0042 -0.0192*** 0.0112*** -0.0128*** 
 
(0.0010) (0.0067) (0.0043) (0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0037) 
I(RDI)t 0.0109*** 0.0608*** 0.0782*** 0.0253*** 0.0841*** 0.0317*** 0.0793*** 0.0309*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0031) (0.0034) (0.0027) (0.0039) (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0026) 
IDV_M -0.0258*** -0.0704*** -0.0427*** -0.0431*** -0.0359*** -0.0448*** -0.0301*** -0.0489*** 
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(0.0015) (0.0038) (0.0062) (0.0028) (0.0056) (0.0027) (0.0037) (0.0034) 
MAS_M 0.0068*** 0.0309*** 0.0188*** 0.0022 0.0169*** 0.0018 0.0124*** 0.0002  
(0.0012) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0026) (0.0017) (0.0026) 
UAI_M 0.0137*** 0.0413*** 0.0249*** 0.0049 0.0339*** 0.0009 0.0145*** 0.0129***  
(0.0014) (0.0039) (0.0044) (0.0038) (0.0052) (0.0034) (0.0028) (0.0029) 
LTO_M 0.0096*** -0.0063* 0.0007 0.0192*** -0.0019 0.0164*** 0.0029 0.0213*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0020) (0.0023) 
IDV_M*CFMAGNt -0.0458*** -0.1664*** -0.1414*** -0.1501** -0.1453*** -0.0640 -0.1226*** -0.0381 
 (0.0086) (0.0315) (0.0173) (0.0635) (0.0191) (0.0462) (0.0147) (0.0856) 
MAS_M*CFMAGNt -0.0070 0.0025 -0.0150 -0.1891*** -0.0194 -0.1044*** -0.0358*** -0.0934** 
 (0.0091) (0.0237) (0.0145) (0.0562) (0.0153) (0.0252) (0.0129) (0.0389) 
UAI_M*CFMAGNt 0.0145 0.0038 0.0140 -0.0957 0.0357* 0.0316 -0.0072 -0.0153 
 (0.0143) (0.0337) (0.0172) (0.0654) (0.0214) (0.0338) (0.0180) (0.0966) 
LTO_M*CFMAGNt 0.0416*** 0.1262*** 0.0341** 0.1346** 0.0308** 0.0389 0.0417*** 0.0713* 
 (0.0096) (0.0208) (0.0136) (0.0570) (0.0148) (0.0266) (0.0133) (0.0421) 
R-squared 0.1372 0.4110 0.3963 0.2764 0.3803 0.2691 0.3895 0.3238 
F-Statistic 629.65 3616.46 2863.37 1451.82 2936.92 1388.22 3575.54 2530.97 
Observations 100,597 100,619 100,597 100,619 100,619 100,597 148,027 100,43 
 
Table 10 presents output estimation of the empirical model (4.3.2.) according to four financial constraints criteria: KZ Index, WW Index, Firm Size and Dividend Payout. The dependent variable 
is CASHt, computed as cash and cash equivalents over total assets. CFLOWt is the ratio pre-tax profits plus depreciation over total assets. CFMAGNt is the interaction of an indicator of negative 
cash flow dummy with cash flow. I(CFNEG)t is a dummy variable set to one when cash flow is negative, and set to 0 otherwise. ICFVOLt is the cash flow standard deviation for each two-digit 
SIC code, computed based on the average of the cash flow standard deviation  of the previous five years. FSIZEt is the natural logarithm of sales. LEVt is the ratio of total total debt to total 
assets. LEV2t is the squared term of leverage. INVOPt is the ratio of the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity over the book value of assets. CAPEXt 
is the ratio of capital expenditures to the book value of assets. I(DIV)t is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm pay dividends and is set to zero otherwise. I(RDI)t is a dummy 
variable set to 1 if the ratio of research and development over total assets is higher than 0.02, and is set to 0 otherwise. IDV is Hofstede’s individualism index. IDV_M is Hofstede’s individualism 
index that equals one for countries above the median, and zero otherwise. MAS is Hofstede’s masculinity index. MAS_M is Hofstede’s masculinity index that equals one for countries above the 
median, and zero otherwise. UAI is Hofstede’s uncertainty-avoidance index. UAI_M is Hofstede’s uncertainty-avoidance index that equals one for countries above the median, and zero otherwise. 
LTO is Hofstede’s long-term orientation index. LTO_M is Hofstede’s long-term orientation index that equals one for countries above the median, and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors to 
heteroscedasticity are reported in parenthesis under each coefficient. Statistically significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.
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Contrary to the results of Han and Qiu (2007), we find that cash flow volatility has a positive 
association with cash holdings of financially constrained firms, as well as with financially 
unconstrained firms. In fact, Han and Qiu (2007) found that, despite the positive and 
significant relation between cash holdings and cash flow volatility in constrained firms, the 
relation of unconstrained firms is insignificant. Our result shows that although with different 
magnitudes, cash flow volatility18 positively affects both constrained and unconstrained 
firms. The magnitude of the coefficient is larger for constrained firms than for 
unconstrained, except in the case of the KZ Index. This means that the increase in cash 
holdings is larger among constrained firms if we consider a similar increase in cash flow 
volatility for constrained and unconstrained firms. Further, contradicting Almeida et al. 
(2004) the model shows the firm’s propensity to save cash out of cash flows is positive and 
significant regardless of firms’ financial condition. Again, this results hold for all the measures 
except for the KZ Index. 
As shown in table 10, financial constraints affect the precautionary motive to hold cash. For 
instance, an increase in investment opportunities creates a greater demand for cash in 
constrained firms rather than in unconstrained. This confirms that constrained firms save 
cash today based on their perception of future investment opportunities. However, this 
might force firms to sacrifice valuable projects today, which can be costly. Opposite to that, 
unconstrained firms have less benefit in holding cash today. Moreover, split the sample into 
financial constrained and unconstrained firms also has an impact on the dummy variable 
dividends. According to the model, financially constrained firms that pay dividends show the 
tendency to hold more cash, while unconstrained firms hold less cash. Nonetheless, this 
relation is only significant using the dividend payout measure. This leads us to the ambiguous 
relation mentioned in the literature. In this case, the relation might show the concern of 
financially constrained firms with the signaling hypothesis. Lastly, constrained firms show a 
higher impact of R&D intensity in their cash policy rather than unconstrained firms. This is 
the expected result given the joint between the fewer possibilities of constrained firms to 
access external capital and the lower asset tangibility of R&D expenditures. 
Using financial constraints criteria’s also exert an influence over the national culture variables 
regarding firms’ cash policy. Even firms in countries where managers suffer more from 
                                                 
18 It is important to note that some authors, as the case of Bates et al. (2009) connect the historical huge increase 
in cash ratios to the increase in industry cash flow volatility. 
52 
overconfidence (individualistic countries), unconstrained firms opt to hold less cash rather 
than constrained firms. Although this relation is negative and significant using all the four 
criteria, the magnitude of the decrease in cash holdings in individualistic countries is lower 
among constrained firms. This displays the increase in the precautionary demand for cash of 
firms, even in individualistic countries. In masculinity societies, constrained firms hold more 
cash than unconstrained ones. In fact, the greater impact might result from the need to avoid 
being subject to the market, therefore holding more cash allows managers of constrained 
firms to keep their investment. Nevertheless, this cultural variable does not have statistical 
impact on unconstrained firms. The cultural dimension uncertainty avoidance is only 
significant for both constrained and unconstrained firms according to the KZ Index and the 
Dividend Payout criteria. According to these criteria, the variable is significant and positive 
at the one-percent level. However, considering the WW Index and the Firm Size measures, 
the variable is only significant for constrained firms, showing that firms in high uncertainty-
avoidance countries hold more cash. Finally, the long-term orientation show results that are 
not consistent across the four financially constrained criteria. This variable is only significant 
for unconstrained firms, displaying a positive relation. This means that firms in long-term 
oriented countries that are financially unconstrained tend to hold more cash than in short-
oriented countries. 
We decide to go further on our analysis and introduce the study of the marginal effect of 
negative cash flows among constrained and unconstrained firms for national culture 
variables. According to the results in table 10, constrained and unconstrained firms with 
negative cash flows hold more cash in individualistic countries than in collectivist countries. 
Actually, considering the KZ Index and WW Index, the magnitude of the negative coefficient 
is higher for unconstrained firms, which means that constrained firms with negative cash 
flows in individualistic countries hold more cash. This might indicate the effect of 
overconfidence is moderated among constrained firms comparing with unconstrained firms. 
For the interaction between masculinity countries and cash flow magnitude, only the 
dividend payout criteria display significant relation for both constrained and unconstrained 
segment of firms. In parallel with the WW Index and the Firm Size, the Dividend Payout 
criteria shows that unconstrained firms with negative cash flows in masculinity countries 
hold less cash than feminist countries. However, firms with negative cash flows that are 
constrained tend to hold more cash than unconstrained firms in masculinity societies. 
Furthermore, the interaction between uncertainty avoidance countries and cash flow 
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magnitude is not significant, except for constrained firms in firm size criteria. The interaction 
variable, which is significant at the ten-percent level, proves that constrained firms with 
negative cash flows in uncertainty avoidance countries hold more cash than in less 
uncertainty avoidance environments. Lastly, firms with negative cash flows in long-term 
oriented countries hold more cash than in short-term oriented countries. This relation holds 
for both constrained and unconstrained firms. Nonetheless, according to the firm size 
criteria the relation is non-significant for unconstrained firms. 
The results that we got from the KZ index in this model are not inexplicable.  In fact, 
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) provided doubts on the validity of the KZ Index as a measure of 
financial constraints. In their study, they find that only two components out of five are 
consistently related to constraints in their sample. 
In sum, in firms where financing constraints are present the financial flexibility is more 
valued. These constraints have the capacity to affect the marginal costs and benefits of 
projects according to the firm’s financial condition. Almeida et al. (2014) refer that managers 
tend to anticipate future frictions and adjust their cash policies in order to minimize the 
impact. In line with this, we provide evidence that the firm’s financial position affects their 
cash policy decisions.  
 
5.4. Robustness Tests 
 
In order to verify the evidence reported, we provide a series of robustness tests in this 
section. First, we decide to change the dependent variable in the model. Considering this, we 
compute the cash ratio through the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to net assets, where 
net assets is the difference between total assets and cash and cash equivalents. This method 
is used by Opler et al. (1999) and Ferreira and Vilela (2004). In addition, we apply the 
approach used by Foley et al. (2007), Bates et al. (2009) and Dudley and Zhang (2016), which 
is the logarithm of cash and cash equivalents to net assets. Then, we regress the equation 
substituting the variable firm size (FSIZEt_2). We follow several authors (Kim et al., 1998; 
Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Bates et al., 2009; 
Dennis and McKeon, 2017) and use as a proxy to firm size the natural logarithm of total 
assets. Lastly, we perform tests regarding the national culture variables. Over the years, 
several authors have challenged the applicability and reliability of Hofstede’s scores. One 
major problem appointed is the failure to capture the changes of culture values over time 
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(Kirkman et al., 2006). However, the cultural dimensions as presented by Hofstede have a 
greater impact than other competing cultural variables (e.g. Schwartz, 1994). We use the 
framework of Tang and Koveos’ (2008), which update Hofstede’s cultural dimensions based 
on the changing in economic environments within countries. Indeed, there is evidence 
proving the dynamics of culture factors over years (e.g. Heuer, Cummings, and Hutabaratt, 
1999)19.  Although uncertainty avoidance and masculinity reflect more stable institutional 
traditions (e.g. language, religion, and geography) than the GDP per capita, which means that 
are less prone to change over time, Tang and Koveos’ (2008) found a curvilinear relationship 
of GDP per capita with individualism and long-term orientation. This means that it is 
important to update Hofstede’s cultural dimensions when there are changes in economic 
conditions. 
In table 11, we present the output of the regressions estimations for our robustness 
conditions, based on the equation (4.3.2.): 
                                                 
19 Heuer, Cummings, and Hutabaratt (1999) found evidence that the difference regarding power distance and 
individualism between Indonesian and US managers has declined in the previous years.  
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Table 11: Estimation Output of Robustness Checks 
 
Table 11 presents output estimation of the robustness tests. In column (1) and (2) we change the dependent variable. In 
column (3) we change the measure of firm size, while in column (4) we compute the national culture variables according to 
Tang and Koveos’(2008). The dependent variable in column (1) CASH_2 is measured as the ratio of cash and cash 
equivalents over net assets, where net assets is the difference between total assets and cash and cash equivalents. The 
dependent variable in column (2) CASH_3 is measured as the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash and cash equivalents 
over net assets. The dependent variable in column (3) and (4) is CASHt, computed as cash and cash equivalents over total 
assets. CFLOWt is the ratio pre-tax profits plus depreciation over total assets. CFMAGNt is the interaction of an indicator 
of negative cash flow dummy with cash flow. I(CFNEG)t is a dummy variable set to one when cash flow is negative, and 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 0.6253*** -2.6701*** 0.1720*** 0.2212*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0812) (0.0065) (0.0120) 
CFLOWt 0.3765*** 1.3981*** -0.2949*** 0.1837*** 
 (0.0691) (0.1575) (0.0288) (0.0189) 
CFMAGNt -0.5399*** -1.7263*** 0.0110*** -0.1938*** 
 (0.0862) (0.2062) (0.0020) (0.0218) 
I(CFNEG)t 0.0912*** 0.2084*** 0.2263*** 0.0352*** 
 (0.0084) (0.0178) (0.0088) (0.0025) 
ICFVOLt 0.0773*** 0.3649*** 0.1419*** 0.0108*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0343) (0.0258) (0.0014) 
FSIZEt -0.0325*** 0.0039  -0.0082*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0056)  (0.0005) 
FSIZEt_2   -0.0019***  
   (0.0004)  
LEVt -0.9802*** -4.5439*** -0.7386*** -0.4390*** 
 (0.0251) (0.1017) (0.0108) (0.0082) 
LEV2t 0.6013*** 3.0104*** 0.8496*** 0.2625*** 
 (0.0362) (0.1082) (0.0145) (0.0091) 
INVOPt 0.0549*** 0.1441*** 0.0235*** 0.0184*** 
 (0.0044) (0.0107) (0.0020) (0.0009) 
CAPEXt -0.9148*** -1.8011*** -0.2872*** -0.2793*** 
 (0.0358) (0.0943) (0.0099) (0.0097) 
I(DIV)t -0.0270*** -0.0525** -0.0095*** -0.0102*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0213) (0.0016) (0.0022) 
I(RDI)t 0.1437*** 0.5279*** 0.0517*** 0.0562*** 
 (0.0097) (0.0191) (0.0024) (0.0032) 
IDV 0.0346*** -0.3425*** -0.0313*** 0.0341*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0484) (0.0035) (0.0041) 
MAS 0.0821*** 0.6101*** 0.0517*** -0.0223*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0453) (0.0054) (0.0057) 
UAI 0.0232 0.0215 0.0033 0.0558*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0666) (0.0059) (0.0100) 
LTO 0.0692*** 0.9566*** 0.0604*** 0.0645*** 
  (0.0114) (0.0371) (0.0041) (0.0036) 
R-squared 0.2360 0.2801 0.3477 0.3165 
F-Statistic 2917.61 9046.79 8189.19 6886.51 
Observations 351,613 351,613 335,355 321,592 
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set to 0 otherwise. ICFVOLt is the cash flow standard deviation for each two-digit SIC code, computed based on the average 
of the cash flow standard deviation  of the previous five years. FSIZEt is the natural logarithm of sales. FSIZEt_2 is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. LEVt is the ratio of total total debt to total assets. LEV2t is the squared term of leverage. 
INVOPt is the ratio of the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity over the 
book value of assets. CAPEXt is the ratio of capital expenditures to the book value of assets. I(DIV)t is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if the firm pay dividends and is set to zero otherwise. I(RDI)t is a dummy variable set to 1 if the 
ratio of research and development over total assets is higher than 0.02, and is set to 0 otherwise. In column (1), (2) and (3) 
IDV is Hofstede’s individualism index. MAS is Hofstede’s masculinity index. UAI is Hofstede’s uncertainty-avoidance 
index. LTO is Hofstede’s long-term orientation index. In column (4) IDV is Tang and Koveos’ (2008) individualism index. 
MAS is Tang and Koveos’ (2008) masculinity index. UAI is Tang and Koveos’ (2008) uncertainty-avoidance index. LTO is 
Tang and Koveos’ (2008) long-term orientation index. Robust standard errors to heteroscedasticity are reported in 
parenthesis under each coefficient. Statistically significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 
In columns (1) and (2) we change the dependent variables, either to the ratio of cash and 
cash equivalents to net assets and the logarithm of cash and cash equivalents over net assets. 
Then, we substitute the independent variable firm size in condition (3). Finally, the condition 
(4) update the original Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (1980, 2001) based on the study of 
Tang and Koveos’ (2008).  
Substituting the dependent variable in the empirical model produces slightly different results 
in condition (1) and (2). In contrast with our model, the first difference is in the variable firm 
size, which becomes positive in the second condition. However, the variable loses its 
statistical significance. The condition (1) change the coefficient signal of the cultural 
dimension individualism. According to the model in this condition, individualistic countries 
tend to hold more cash. It is also possible to notice that changing the method to compute 
the dependent variable (condition 1 and condition 2) do not change the statistical significance 
of uncertainty-avoidance cultural dimension. Indeed, the variable do not have statistical 
strength to explain the level of cash holdings. Regarding the remaining variables, there are 
no statistically significant differences among variables in both conditions. Moreover, the R-
squared suggest that our model is substantially more appropriate to explain the behaviour of 
our dependent variable. The condition (3) suggest that either ways of computing firm size 
produce a negative coefficient, that is statistically significant at the one-percent level. 
Although this condition suggests a positive association between cash holdings and 
uncertainty-avoidance, the variable is not statistically significant. Concerning the condition 
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(4) we eliminate from the sample countries20 which national culture variables were not 
updated by Tang and Koveos’ (2008). In this condition, the financial variables maintain the 
same coefficients and levels of significance. The only difference is in the national culture 
variables. According to the Tang and Koveos’ (2008) updated dimensions, individualism has 
a positive association with cash ratio, while masculinity has a negative relationship. In 
addition, the variable uncertainty avoidance becomes positive and statistically significant at 
the one-percent level. 
In general, the robustness test supports the conclusion drawn from the main models, despite 
highlighting some weakness in two Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, individualism, and 
masculinity.
                                                 
20 The countries that we removed from our sample were Czech Republic, China, Hungary, Morocco, Poland, 
Russia and Taiwan. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The present study investigates how corporate cash holdings of 45 countries are influenced 
by losses, using a panel data for the period between 1992 and 2016. We include in our study 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (1980, 2001) since prior studies do not inform on the impact 
of culture variables for firms reporting losses. This allows providing insights on whether the 
effect of national culture variables varies according the sign of cash flows. Additionally, we 
attempt to comprehend the response of cash holdings to variations of constrained firm’s 
volatility, as well the impact of constraints on cultural variables. 
Our results suggest a positive and statistically significant relation of cash holdings with cash 
flow, the existence of negative cash flow, cash flow volatility, higher levels of leverage, 
investment opportunities, payment of dividends and R&D intensity. In contrast, the 
magnitude of cash flows, firm size, lower levels of leverage and capital expenditures impacts 
negatively on cash holdings. These variables are statistically significant and in accordance 
with the majority of the available literature, supporting the hypothesis that both the 
transaction and precautionary explains the level of cash holdings of firms reporting losses. 
Concerning the national culture variables, we find that firms in masculinity, uncertainty 
avoidance and long-term oriented countries tend to hold larger amounts of cash, while the 
relation is inverse in individualistic countries. However, we also provide evidence that the 
magnitude of negative cash flows affects cultural variables. Mainly, firms in masculinity 
countries with negative cash flows have less cash than feminist societies, while the 
overconfidence bias associated with individualistic countries keeps the impact on manager’s 
decision even in negative cash flow firms. According to our study, the interaction term 
between uncertainty avoidance countries and losses is not significant in explaining the level 
of cash. 
Finally, we argue that firm’s financial constraint position influence their cash policy decisions. 
Contrary to Han and Qiu (2007), we evidence that, although with different magnitudes, both 
constrained and unconstrained firms response positively in terms of cash holdings against 
cash flow volatility variations. The results suggest a positive relation of masculinity, 
uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation with cash holdings, while a negative relation 
of individualism regardless firm’s financial condition. Further, we report evidence that the 
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effect of individualism is moderated by firm’s financial position, as unconstrained firms with 
negative cash flows in highly individualistic countries hold less cash. In this regard, the impact 
on cash holdings of firms with negative cash flow firms in long-term oriented countries is 
lower for constrained firms than for unconstrained firms.  
Our evidence supports the hypothesis of an additional precaution regarding cash holdings 
of firms reporting losses, exacerbated when these losses are persistent. We do not find 
enough evidence supporting that any of the main theories of cash is completely consistent 
with our results. 
In order to correctly access the country’s national culture and firm’s financial constraints, we 
use the most common methods presented in the empirical literature. However, the literature 
is not clear about which method is more suitable and reliable to proxy both financial 
constraints and national dimensions. This poses the main limitation of our study. Regarding 
national culture variables we use Hofstede’s study (1980, 2001), although Tang and Koveos’ 
(2008) cultural indices, Globe Research project and Schwartz (1994) cultural dimensions are 
also well-known methods applied to deal with national culture. According to Kirkman et al. 
(2006), Hofstede’s cultural factors has been criticized because it reduces the term culture to 
five dimensions, limiting the sample to only one multinational corporation and fails to 
capture the flexibility of culture over time. Some doubts were also raised related to the 
validity of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, considering that the data were gathered in the 
1960s and 1970s. However, Kirkman et al. (2006) not only refer that recent research confirms 
the validity of Hofstede conclusion, but also that the framework is the most comprehensive 
to analyze the effect of national culture on corporate financial decisions.  
Regarding financial constraints, we follow several proxies in order to get more robust 
conclusions (Almeida et al., 2004; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Whited and Wu, 2006). Even 
though these are recognized methods, the literature has numerous alternatives, as the case of 
Hadlock and Pierce (2010). Albeit, as discussed in section (4.4.1) there still no consensus in 
the literature about the perfect model to access financial constraints. 
Regarding future research suggestions, it would be important to develop a more detailed 
study including governance factors to test the possible association with cash holdings of 
firms reporting losses. Moreover, we consider that an analysis of the impact of financial crisis 
on firms reporting losses during our sample period would be important to understand how 
firms adapt their cash to these negative events. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A – Variables Description 
 
Table A. 1: Description of variables 
CASHt Cash and cash equivalents over total assets. 
CASHt_2 Ratio of cash and cash equivalents over net assets, where net assets is the difference between total assets and cash and cash equivalents. 
CFLOWt Ratio pre-tax profits plus depreciation over total assets. 
CFMAGNt Interaction of an indicator of negative cash flow dummy with cash flow. 
I(CFNEG)t Dummy variable set to one when cash flow is negative, and set to 0 otherwise. 
I(CFNEG)t-3 Dummy variable set to one when cash flow is negative in t-1, t-2 and t-3, and set to 0 otherwise. 
CFVOLt Cash flow standard deviation computed based on the average of the cash flow standard deviation  of the previous ten years. 
ICFVOLt Cash flow standard deviation for each two-digit SIC code, computed based on the average of the cash flow standard deviation of the previous ten years. 
FSIZEt Natural logarithm of sales. 
FSIZEt_2 Natural logarithm of total assets. 
LEVt Ratio of total total debt to total assets. 
LEV2t Squared term of leverage. 
INVOPt Ratio of the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity over the book value of assets. 
CAPEXt Ratio of capital expenditures to the book value of assets. 
I(DIV)t Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm pay dividends and is set to zero otherwise. 
I(RDI)t Dummy variable set to 1 if the ratio of research and development over total assets is higher than 0.02, and is set to 0 otherwise. 
IDV Hofstede’s individualism index. 
IDV_M Hofstede’s individualism index that equals one for countries above the median, and zero otherwise. 
MAS Hofstede’s masculinity index. 
MAS_M Hofstede’s masculinity index that equals one for countries above the median, and zero otherwise. 
UAI Hofstede’s uncertainty-avoidance index. 
UAI_M Hofstede’s uncertainty-avoidance index that equals one for countries above the median, and zero otherwise. 
LTO Hofstede’s long-term orientation index. 
LTO_M Hofstede’s long-term orientation index that equals one for countries above the median, and zero otherwise. 
  
 
 
Appendix B – Summary Statistics 
 
Table B. 1: Observations by Country 
The table report firm-year observation for each country included in the study.  
 Firm-Year Observations Percentage 
Argentina 333 0.10 
Australia 13,623 4.06 
Austria 524 0.16 
Belgium 1,26 0.38 
Brazil 2,297 0.68 
Canada 9,898 2.95 
Chile 1,498 0.45 
China 12,817 3.82 
Colombia 44 0.01 
Denmark 1,839 0.55 
Finland 1,79 0.53 
France 7,869 2.35 
Germany 7,102 2.12 
Greece 2,458 0.73 
Hong Kong 10,502 3.13 
Hungary 8 0.00 
India 17,997 5.37 
Indonesia 3,866 1.15 
Ireland 524 0.16 
Israel 2,478 0.74 
Italy 2,674 0.80 
Japan 58,618 17.48 
Malaysia 11,182 3.33 
Mexico 1,366 0.41 
Morocco 63 0.02 
Netherlands 2,34 0.70 
New Zealand 939 0.28 
Norway 1,956 0.58 
Pakistan 1,963 0.59 
Philippines 1,204 0.36 
Poland 2,74 0.82 
Portugal 423 0.13 
Russia 1,015 0.30 
Singapore 6,903 2.06 
South Africa 3,712 1.11 
South Korea 16,407 4.89 
Spain 1,554 0.46 
Sweden 4,093 1.22 
Switzerland 2,796 0.83 
Taiwan 18,083 5.39 
Thailand 5,924 1.77 
Turkey 2,502 0.75 
United Kingdom 21,234 6.33 
United States 66,932 19.96 
Venezuela 5 0.00 
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Table B. 2: National Culture Values by Country 
The table report the mean values for each of the national culture values included in the study. Values are displayed 
by country. 
 IDV MAS UAI LTO 
Argentina 46 56 86 20 
Australia 90 61 51 21 
Austria 55 79 70 60 
Belgium 75 54 94 82 
Brazil 38 49 76 44 
Canada 80 52 48 36 
Chile 23 28 86 31 
China 20 66 30 87 
Colombia 13 64 80 13 
Denmark 74 16 23 35 
Finland 63 26 59 38 
France 71 43 86 63 
Germany 67 66 65 83 
Greece 35 57 112 45 
Hong Kong 25 57 29 61 
Hungary 80 88 82 58 
India 48 56 40 51 
Indonesia 14 46 48 62 
Ireland 70 68 35 24 
Israel 54 47 81 38 
Italy 76 70 75 61 
Japan 46 95 92 88 
Malaysia 26 50 36 41 
Mexico 30 69 82 24 
Morocco 46 53 68 14 
Netherlands 80 14 53 67 
New Zealand 79 58 49 33 
Norway 69 8 50 35 
Pakistan 14 50 70 50 
Philippines 32 64 44 27 
Poland 60 64 93 38 
Portugal 27 31 104 28 
Russia 39 36 95 81 
Singapore 20 48 8 72 
South Africa21 65 63 49 34 
South Korea 18 39 85 100 
Spain 51 42 86 48 
Sweden 71 5 29 53 
Switzerland 68 70 58 74 
Taiwan 17 45 69 93 
Thailand 20 34 64 32 
Turkey 37 45 85 46 
United Kingdom 89 66 35 51 
United States 91 62 46 26 
Venezuela 12 73 76 16 
 
                                                 
21 We joint together the two South Africa present in Hofstede’s study. Individualism, Masculinity and 
Uncertainty Avoidance are from Normal South Africa, while Long-Term Orientation is from White South 
Africa. 
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Table B. 3: Collinearity Statistics - VIF Test 
The table report the outputs of the estimation of the variance inflation factor. 
 
Independent Variable VIF 
CFLOW 2.06 
I(CFNEG) 2.06 
ICFVOL 1.48 
FSIZE 1.51 
LEV 1.21 
INVOP 1.13 
CAPEX 1.08 
I(DIV) 1.43 
I(RDI) 1.12 
IDV 2.45 
MAS 1.44 
UAI 1.53 
LTO 2.83 
 
Table B. 4: Mean Cash Ratio 
The table report the evolution of average cash holdings, measured as the ratio of cash over net assets, by year for the 
sample of 335,355 firm-year observations, from 1992 to 2016. Values are an average over firm-year observations 
within each decile. 
Year Cash/Net Assets 
1992 0.3143 
1993 0.3356 
1994 0.3294 
1995 0.3200 
1996 0.3092 
1997 0.3204 
1998 0.3177 
1999 0.3157 
2000 0.3172 
2001 0.3185 
2002 0.3358 
2003 0.3400 
2004 0.3408 
2005 0.3381 
2006 0.3339 
2007 0.3328 
2008 0.3229 
2009 0.3380 
2010 0.3360 
2011 0.3346 
2012 0.3302 
2013 0.3253 
2014 0.3261 
2015 0.3345 
2016 0.3328 
 
